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Croatia's Granic Calls on Serbs To Join Accord

AU0303151394 Paris AFP in English 1443 GMT 03 Mar 94

[Text] Paris, March 3 (AFP)—Visiting Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic called on Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbs Thursday to join the negotiations between the ex-Yugoslav republic's Moslems and Croats on forming a federation.

"We share France's view that an agreement must be reached with the Serbs," Granic said after a meeting with French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. Croats will suggest "the Serbs join this federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the same conditions which have been accepted by the other two parties (Croats and Moslems), and the negotiations which are going to start" in the wake of the federation agreement signed Tuesday in Washington.

However Croatia would seek "the support of France and the European Union to get back" land captured by Serbs in Croatia, he said. "Of course we want to normalize relations with Belgrade, but this can only be done with reintegration, through peaceful means, of (Serb-) occupied territories in Croatia, as is provided for in the plan signed in Washington."

Granic also said he "agreed the humanitarian situation should improve as quickly as possible" in Bosnia. Humanitarian convoys must be allowed to travel unhindered through central Bosnia and "all prisoners" of war should be freed.

Juppe for his part said France believed "there could be no stable settlement unless the Serb community were associated" with the federation agreement. He stressed the "situation on the ground must improve" and noted the "air network" set up by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations to discourage renewed hostilities remained "in effect."

Juppe said a "global settlement" of the almost two-year-old Bosnian conflict meant "active participation by the Americans, Russians, and Europeans" and that the European Union "will participate in the region's reconstruction" once peace has returned.

Yugoslav Radio Ship Stops Broadcasting

LD0303182894 Hilversum Radio Netherlands in English 1150 GMT 3 Mar 94

[From the weekly "Media Network" feature]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The radio ship broadcasting off the coast of Yugoslavia, known as Radio Brod, went off the air on Tuesday at midnight. The station had been broadcasting to all of the former Yugoslavia since April of last year. The European Union, which had been backing the project, said it could no longer provide financial support because of an administrative reorganization. The journalists from throughout the former Yugoslavia who were involved in the project are understandably furious. At a press conference on Tuesday they said the weren't given any warning about the move and therefore couldn't look for alternative financing.

The journalists have asked Italy for authorization to set up a transmitter off the Italian coast. Italy, they say, is their last hope because the republics of the former Yugoslavia have all refused to allow them to erect a transmitter and the Albanian government hasn't responded. [passage omitted]

The ship is now sailing to Marseille in the south of France and the 19 journalists on board all plan to return home—except for the three Bosnians, who have no home to return to.

Berisha, PDP Leader View National Rights

AU0403090594 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] At noon today Albanian President Sali Berisha received the delegation of the Party for Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] led by Chairman Arben Xhaferri.

I am happy to receive you, President Berisha said, and I follow the developments in your party with interest. Its recently acquired freedom to function, through the democratic mechanism of free vote in the last assembly and free elections in your party branches, enables party members to be engaged and contribute to the guaranteeing of Albanian human and national rights, as well as the development of democracy of Macedonia and its stability. An independent and stable Macedonia is in the interest not only of Albania, but also of all the peoples in the Balkans who are concerned about peace in the region. That is why we are determined to increase cooperation with Macedonia in the spirit of understanding. The Serb chauvinists and its ultranationalist allies desire the destabilization of Macedonia today.

Your party must accomplish many tasks and should seriously work to implement them. The efforts of Albanians today should be concentrated in order to prevent conflict, develop and promote democracy, and establish local democratic institutions, i.e. found various democratic institutions.

I want to tell you that the more evident the principles of democracy and the present European civilization are for the Albanians, the stronger they will be, and the more friends Albania and the Albanian nation in general will have. In all your efforts, you should assess what has been achieved through dialogue and democratic means and insist on the implementation of your rights and freedoms in conformity with the Helsinki Act and other international documents.

For his part, in thanks for the reception, Arben Xhaferri, chairman of the Party for Democratic Prosperity of the Albanians in Macedonia, said that we support and will contribute to stability in Macedonia, but we are not relinquishing efforts to raise and strengthen our institutions as centers that generate values of patriotism and national rights. Thus can we create common valued of civilization with other nationals, which together connect us with Europe. I thank the Albanian Government for the support it has given and is giving to liberate and educate our students.

Delegation member Mendu Thaci said that we hope, through hard work, to give our party its due role, so that the party is engaged inasmuch as possible in Macedonian political life. The assembly proceedings confirmed that this party enjoys the support of Albanians in Macedonia not only through the number of members, but also because of the assessment made by the Albanian intellectual world.

Zhelev Notes Historical Ties With Russia

AU0303103994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0915 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Speech by President Zhelyu Zhelev at National Day ceremony on Mount Shipka in commemoration of the Russian soldiers, other foreign troops, and Bulgarian volunteers who died in battle during the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War of Liberation—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Today, 116 years later, as we look back over the distance that separates us from that memorable event, we see that despite the vicissitudes of fate and the trials of history, our people still preserve feelings of gratitude and appreciation. Alongside this, however, a sense of national dignity has developed, although this was extremely debased during the previous regime. Together with the democratic process, we have strengthened our efforts to follow an independent foreign policy solely in conformity with our national interests and with the principles and norms of international law.

This is why today, while preserving our own firm foreign policy orientation toward Europe, toward integration into the European structures, toward the Euro-Atlantic system of security, the Republic of Bulgaria renounces neither the historical and cultural values that bind us to Russia, such as our common Slavonic roots, the alphabet introduced by Cyril and Methodius, our century-long spiritual and religious links, and our national liberation, nor do we renounce our economic positions and interests in the Russian markets and the markets of the other former Soviet republics. What is more, we consider that the historical values that bind us together, cleansed of ideological overlays and freed from political exploitation to which they were subjected by the communist regime, precisely at this time are revealing their true value. Now our relations with Russia are being built upon a democratic foundation of equality in the eyes of the law. For this reason, no political force or group in Bulgaria has the right to appropriate or monopolize the links between our two peoples and countries, nor identify its narrow party interests with the interests of the state in relation to Russia. This was the case at one time, and the sad results of it are sufficiently well-known to all.

On a day such as this, I believe it is important that we should show that we have dissociated ourselves from violence and phobias, to recall what happened more than a century ago, and to realize that we are first and foremost citizens of the Republic of Bulgaria, within which we not only live but also have common national interests. In this context, it is foolish to put our relations with one group of countries in opposition to those with others. Partisanship in foreign policy has never brought anything good for our country, all the more now, when the Balkans are an extremely explosive region.

Apart from everything else, the Third of March returns our thoughts to Bulgaria's unrealized national ideals. Taught by the bitter experience of four wars and the ravages wrought by two uprisings in this century, today we seek to realize these ideals not though shifting borders, but through opening them up with free intercourse, by making the Balkans an inseparable part of a single, democratic, united, civilized Europe.

Homage to the bright memory of the heroes of the War of Liberation!

BIS Chief Congratulates U.S. on Exposing Ames

AU0403112094 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 1 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by "cer": "Devaty Congratulates CIA on Success]

[Text] Prague—Stanislav Devaty, acting director of Czech counterintelligence, BIS, commented yesterday on the case of exposed Russian spy Aldrich Ames, otherwise a high-ranking official of the U.S. intelligence service, the CIA.

Stanislav Devaty told a CESKY DENIK correspondent: "In my post, I can only congratulate our U.S. colleagues on their great success. I must say that in all the time I have held this position, since August 1992, I have not come across a case that would be even remotely reminiscent of a CIA employee's defection. As a citizen, I am distressed by the confirmation of my concerns that even under the new circumstances Russia has not changed its approach to the objects of its interest. The head of Russian intelligence, Primakov, recently said that the Czech Republic's place in Russia's sphere of certain interests does not mean that Russia conducts activity against the interest or laws of our country. In view of what has happened, I am not certain whether this statement of his can be trusted."

Commentary: Czech, NATO Interests Disparate

AU0403111294 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 2 Mar 94 p 3

[Commentary by Josef Mlejnek: "Czech and NATO Interests"]

[Text] The most recent statements by Russian officials, whether President Yeltsin or Foreign Minister Kozyrev, have confirmed the Russian veto on the Central Europe countries' joining NATO and reopened the issue of Czech security. The word "reopen" is not the correct word because the problem has been constantly open since November 1989. Certain incorrigible optimists, lulled by the Partnership for Peace bait, have realized the urgency of the problem in view of these statements. Not only they have realized it. The most recent Russian "offensive" in the Balkans has shown to us that the Russian position as a world power is beginning to assume a giant dimension once again.

The countries of Central Europe are afraid, understandably, and will probably seek a protective wing in Western institutions. They will use the Partnership for Peace as a shield (has anyone in Prague tried to find out why Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev is so happy about the project?) and will speak about common values and sovereignty, which no one can allegedly violate. They still see NATO as the principal prospective defender of their security and sovereignty. However, the situation in the Balkans has shown us NATO with its pants down, weak, and rusty. Greece, a full NATO member, has not used its right to veto the "warning air strikes," but it refused to participate in any of the Alliance's actions. Moreover, it has conducted policy that has supported Russia rather than Brussels. We cannot have any objections—if Greece's temporary break with NATO is worth it, Athens must have a good reason for its behavior. (Or they may believe that they have such a reason, with is even more important.) This reason is national, or state interests. The same applies to Turkey, which threatened to leave the pact if the air strikes were not launched. What can we infer from that? The state interests of individual countries are above the interests of the Alliance itself. Not only in the Balkans' case. On the basis of that example, we can surmise that other member countries could behave in a similar way if a potential conflict applied to them as the Balkans' conflict applies to Greece and Turkey. The old common enemy has disappeared, and a new one is still to appear inasmuch as the neoimperialist Russia is definitely not an enemy to the West.

The interests of the NATO members, mainly of the United States as NATO's main driving force, are aimed at cooperating with Moscow. In the West, they are happy that Moscow can secure peace and order in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan, and that it will stop the dangerous disintegration of the immense space of the former Soviet Union. The state interests of the United States itself were shifted to Southeast Asia a long time ago. Here, in that region, Washington is very concerned about becoming a direct ally of Moscow. It is definitely not in NATO's interest to confront Russia, much less on behalf of Central Europe.

The Czech Republic wants to get under "NATO's protective umbrella" as protection against the threat from the East. What follows from that? It is a simple and, for us, an unpleasant fact. The Czech Republic's and NATO's interests are outright disparate. This is one additional reason why it would be naive to think about joining NATO at this very moment. However, not all of the Czech and Western interests are so incompatible, but this is not enough to help us become a member in the Western security structures. The Czech Republic has common interests also with its neighbors and quasi-neighbors, who are more affected by the Russian threat than Paris or Amsterdam, for instance. We must quickly abandon our illusions, the old cliches. We must analyze the new situation with a cool head and respond to it appropriately. We do not have much time, but it may not be too late, either—let us hope.

Army Sells Arms to Domestic, Foreign Customers

AU0303135694 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 2 Mar 94 p 1

[CTK report: "The Army Is Selling Arms, but It Is a Secret to Whom and for How Much"]

[Text] Prague—The Czech Army, which has the obligation to reduce its arsenal under international treaties, is either destroying its excess arms or selling them to Czech companies or abroad.

The Defense Ministry told MLADA FRONTA DNES that it had sold over 20,000 pistols through selected commercial firms last year, plus 13 combat planes, four armored vehicles, and two helicopters.

The ministry declined to provide details on where and for how much the technology was sold because that is a trade secret. According to Bretislav Gregr, director of the Ministry of Industry and Trade Licensing Administration, the technology that the Army sold is mostly nonfunctional.

The trading company Omnipol, for instance, sold two combat planes to Austria. They were a Soviet-made MiG 21-F and an L-29 jet of domestic production. A MiG-15 from the Army arsenal was sold to Britain, and two OT-65 armored transporters from Army inventory were sold to the Netherlands. In all cases, the buyers were collectors—reportedly.

Omnipol also wanted to sell, from the Czech Army surplus, several thousand CZ-52 pistols to Canada and the United States. The deal did not materialize, however.

Two helicopters that were sold last year were bought by a domestic company, and the machines have not left the Czech Republic.

Apart from the military material that was sold, the Army has destroyed 583 combat armored vehicles, 28 aircraft, 606 tanks, and 621 artillery systems. Combat technology has been destroyed according to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Treaty on Conventional Arms Reduction since 1992.

Daily Says Harvard Funds Controlled by Kozeny

AU0303161294 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 2 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by "(sim, ina)": "Harvard Funds Are a Family Business Run by Kozeny"]

[Text] Viktor Kozeny, as president of Harvard Capital and Consulting, represents, within this company, the interests of the majority owner of the shares. According to Boris Vostry, company vice president for foreign operations, Kozeny can directly influence events in the company without having to change the members in its supreme bodies and without being a member of the board.

Even after his resignation from the board, Kozeny remained in the five-member executive committee, which operatively controls Harvard Capital and Consulting.

"Harvard is Kozeny's family business, and speculations about his position are therefore irrelevant," Vostry said. The fact that Viktor Kozeny resigned from the Harvard Capital and Consulting board has changed nothing regarding his position of majority owner of the firm, Vostry added. Officially, it is impossible to precisely verify the property situation in Harvard funds because their shares are not tradable, and this information is protected by law. According to a source from another privatization fund, who did not want his name to be revealed because he wanted to avoid possible problems, Kozeny owns the majority of the shares, and another part (of the company) is controlled by his grandfather, Frantisek Stehlik.

Kozeny, he affirms, has resigned from the board for health reasons. Ivan Kralik, a former employee of the Presidential Office of Husak [Czechoslovak president under the communist regime] and a member of the company's board, has been entrusted with chairing the board. Kralik also worked at the Castle for a certain time after Havel assumed office.

Military Exercise Facilities Offered to NATO

AU0303181594 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 1 Mar 94 p 4

[Unattributed report in the "Slovakia" column: "An Interesting Offer to NATO"]

[Text] Bratislava—Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar offered the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) the use of military exercise facilities on the territory of Slovakia. Ondrej Hanko, director of the Slovak Government Press Department, disclosed this after a meeting between Prime Minister Meciar and Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO deputy secretary general for political affairs. Von Moltke heads a NATO delegation that is currently in Slovakia discussing the military and political aspects of Slovak participation in the Partnership for Peace project.

Furthermore, the prime minister informed his guest about a new plan for Slovak Army exercises that also assumes joint exercises with the armies of the Alliance member countries. The offer of the use of military exercise facilities was accepted favorably by von Moltke, Hanko said, and added that the high-ranking official of the Alliance appreciated the "rapid and unequivocal" union with the project on the part of Slovakia. The prime minister also proposed that a NATO school be established in Slovakia that would serve not only the Visegrad Four countries but also other countries interested in joining the Alliance.

Prime Minister Reviews Visit to East Asia

AU0303203994 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 26 Feb 94 p 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Jan Smolec; place and date not given: "We Will Not Be the Armory of the World, but..."]

[Text] [Smolec] Mr. Prime Minister, during the past few days, you have held meetings with politicians and businessmen in Moscow, Tashkent, Beijing, Shanghai, Bangkok, Karachi, and Ankara. This was a journey of 25,000 kilometers. From where do you have the best reports?

[Meciar] We have good reports from each country, but the most important ones are, in any case, from China. We were received by President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng. The signing of an agreement on trade-economic and cultural cooperation opens up a huge market for Slovakia. This giant country appreciated the fact that Slovakia was one of the first countries in East Europe to come and discuss cooperation with the PRC.

[Smolec] Ill-wishers are accusing you of flirting with a socialist country, are they not?

[Meciar] The whole world trades with the People's Republic of China. China was the first of the Asian countries to recognize us as a state. There are no contentious issues between us. China has a dominant economic-strategic position in Asia. It is undergoing a complicated transformation process. In Shanghai, they are quite literally achieving a minor economic miracle. We want to learn from what the Chinese are doing. What China does well, we want to take up ourselves. I do not pay any attention to what the ill-wishers say.

[Smolec] In China, Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey, you shrewdly pointed out to politicians and businessmen that Slovakia was once a "power" in arms production. Now it is producing only 8 percent of its original output. We had politicians who forced us to repent for having experts who manufactured high-quality weapons.

[Meciar] Others have come into the arms markets we left. We are offering these products to NATO. No agreements were reached with Germany or France; on the other hand, they reached an agreement with the Czech Republic. We did not come to an agreement with Great Britain. So, we are looking for ways of cooperating with others. For example, with Turkey, Thailand, and other countries. World experts admire the technical standard of Slovak weapons because, in some respects, it is unique. We do not want to turn Slovakia into the world's armory, but we see no need to destroy our arms industry. It is important that we are able to compete. We have to make up quickly for the loss we suffered through no fault of our own. The tradition of our products means a lot. Very few people know that the cannon that Columbus fired when he discovered America was made in Upper Hungary—that is, on the territory of present-day Slovakia.

[Smolec] During your trip, did anyone express any doubts about Slovakia?

[Meciar] The Slovak Republic was viewed everywhere we went as a reliable and responsible partner. They did not know much about us in Pakistan, but, when we told them about Slovakia, they expressed an interest in visiting it.

Romania's Vacaroiu, Meciar Cited on Agreements

LD0303231594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu was in Bratislava today on a one-day visit to Slovakia. [passage omitted] Our editor Ivo Kunsch was present at a news briefing at which the Slovak and Romanian prime ministers answered journalists' questions.

[Kunsch] [passage omitted] Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu commented on the signing of agreements:

[Vacaroiu in Romanian fading into Slovak report read by Kunsch] We have continued in Bratislava today what we started during Prime Minister's Meciar's visit in

Bucharest last year. It is especially good that we are discussing all problems openly and sincerely, but, at the same time, we very strictly oversee that all of what we have agreed to becomes reality. Today, more than seven months since Prime Minister's Meciar's visit to Bucharest, we can say that we have made progress in all aspects. However, the most important fact is that we have almost completed the legislative framework needed to get bilateral relations between traders on a higher level. We envisage that several meetings will be held at both governmental and parliamentary levels this year. Slovakia is the second country with which Romania signed a memorandum on trade liberalization.

[Kunsch] So much for the Romanian prime minister's comment on the signed agreements. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar also talked about this important event. He said Romania and Slovakia had completed the part of contractual obligations that were necessary for trade cooperation of a simple type. Talks on the transition to free trade have started already today, and the drafting of agreements will begin shortly. It is a matter for the teams of experts and a question of how soon they will prepare the conditions. The political will is to have this as soon as possible.

The Romanian prime minister was also received by Ivan Gasparovic, chairman of parliament, and Slovak President Michal Kovac. Nicolae Vacaroiu left Bratislava shortly before "Radiozurnal" [this news bulletin] went on the air.

Meciar, Slota Hold News Conference After Talks

AU0403095294 Bratislava SME in Slovak 1 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by "(rk)": "V. Meciar Favors Election on 24 and 25 June"]

[Text] Bratislava—"I think it is admirable that Mr. Kohl has expressed an opinion on something about which he does not think it necessary to ascertain the actual facts; this underscores the credibility of his point of view," said V. Meciar following the coalition talks between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party [SNS] in reply to a question from SME on what he thinks of the view expressed by A. Kohl, secretary general of the European Democratic Union, who feels that holding a referendum on the deputies' mandates is incompatible with Slovakia's membership in the Council of Europe.

According to Meciar, the need to stabilize the situation and to resolve the current political crisis was discussed at the coalition talks. The two parties agreed to fundamental talks with the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] on the means of achieving stability. He also pointed out that it was necessary to take into consideration the forceful protest from representatives of the Association of Slovak Towns and Communities against holding local and national elections at the same time and the view expressed by more than 400,000 citizens that all three issues be resolved by a referendum. "It is in the interests of the state to hold the elections as soon as possible. The optimum date seems to us to be 24-25 June, but our two parties do not have enough votes to push this through parliament. Therefore, we need to negotiate with other political parties," said the prime minister. He added that "we have agreed with the SDL that both parties will hold talks with it."

SNS Chairman Jan Slota said that the date of the early elections is the most important thing. He said that, for the SNS, "the most suitable time is June. For this reason, it is necessary to strive to ensure at all costs that the elections are held in June, and, if the Slovak part of the SDL decides to support them, we will be very pleased." He specified what he meant by the Slovak part of the SDL as follows: "You would have to look among those deputies and see. There are enough ethnic Hungarian deputies there and, perhaps, also deputies of other nationalities. In this part of the SDL, the majority are Slovaks."

In reaction to the possibility that no agreement will be reached in parliament, V. Meciar said that, in this case, the citizens will have to decide because "such a loss of time leads to a decline in credits and a decline in investments, the state's economic interests are harmed, and the laws that can help the economy cannot be passed."

According to the prime minister, the petition questions and the referendum do not only concern whether a deputy can make a free decision when laws are being determined, but also whether the citizen has the right to supervise a deputy's activity. The statements made by the Christian Democratic Union "are, in this regard, a distortion of the situation; they do not correspond to the political, legal, or actual situation, and I believe that it will be necessary, to say the least, to draft a new electoral law," added the prime minister.

SNS Lists Priorities, Favors June Election

AU0403091994 Bratislava SME in Slovak 1 Mar 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "According To Slovak National Party Chairman J. Slota, Slovaks Must Struggle To Ensure That 'No Minority Hinders the State-Forming Nation'"]

[Text] Bratislava—According to Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota, it would be best for Slovakia if early parliamentary elections were held in June.

He also said that the "Bolsheviks" from the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] are trying to push back the date of the elections as far as possible so that "they can reveal how they will come again in the role of apostles and redeem this country." He commented that "they redeemed it like this once before, in 1948, and now they are preparing to do so again." J. Slota is of the opinion that the communists and Bolsheviks, as he calls the SDL

members, are responsible for Slovakia's current economic situation. The SNS chairman unreservedly supports the drive for a petition and holding a referendum on all three questions.

The SNS does not see priority in its activity being given to the economic sphere because its aims are national ones. J. Slota emphasized that there is also a social subtext in this "national" aspect, and he added that "we Slovaks must struggle to ensure that we all get on well and that this state-forming nation is not endangered by any minority." The SNS would like the state's defense to be oriented toward maintaining its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders. The SNS is in favor of the Slovak Army achieving combat readiness "so that we can be sure that we have something to defend ourselves with," he said. Another SNS priority is culture. "Here we would like to take a look at the funds given to the Hungarian press and culture, while, at the same time, our Slovaks in South Slovakia are disregarded," said Slota. According to him, the Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic has above-average rights. He said that they are constantly bringing relations [between the communities] to a head. He pointed out that "the Hungarians and the smallest ethnic minority (the Jews) have a strong lobby here and that they are against Slovakia. Perhaps, they have different aims for Slovakia, aims at variance with those of the SNS," he added.

Jan Slota would not refuse the post of defense minister if it were offered to him. However, he does not want this fact to be associated with his attacks on Defense Minister Andrejcak. He added that Andrejcak is only supported in his post by the former political instructors and members of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee and Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee whom he has left in the Army.

New SNS Chairman on 'Danger' to Republic

LD0303185094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Excerpts] I am Slota the terrible! I am the new chairman of the Slovak National Party [SNS]! This is how the SNS chairman welcomed journalists at the party's regular news conference today. [passage omitted] After the news conference, Jan Slota spoke to our correspondent Lydia Mrazova. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Mrazova] Mr. Chairman, in an interview for the SLOVENSKY NAROD newspaper, you said that your members and sympathizers were aware of the danger threatening the Slovak Republic. "Danger" is a very serious term that can hide anything. What, then, is your interpretation of danger in current politics?

[Slota] I understand the term "danger" as two distinct dangers. On the one hand, as the communist danger, and, on the other, as a danger from the south. As regards the former, I wish to stress that it would be very dangerous if Slovaks supported left-wing parties because, in 1948, this danger was also underestimated. Perhaps not so much in Slovakia, but, all the same, eventually communism was planted in Slovakia, too, and we know very well what sort of time followed, the 1950's and all that. So the Slovaks should not forget the past.

As regards the latter, the south, well, anyone who does not wish to see will not see. But we, SNS members, really do see how Slovaks in the south of Slovakia, the very people whose state and territory this is, find themselves in a position of an ethnic minority. Slovaks are afraid and migrate to the north. In a word, they are afraid to assert themselves as Slovaks. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Moravcik Warns of 'Authoritarian' Trend

AU0403094894 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 26 Feb 94 pp 1, 4

[Report on news conference by Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik by SMENA correspondent (bg) in Bratislava on 25 February: "It Is a Long Way to the President"]

[Text] Jozef Moravcik, who submitted his resignation to President Michal Kovac on Wednesday [23 February], gave a briefing at the Foreign Ministry yesterday for "select" members of the media. He discussed many domestic and foreign policy issues. We have selected the most important questions and answers. J. Moravcik said the following in connection with our image abroad:

"Foreign countries are monitoring our situation very carefully, and one thing is becoming clear to them from our domestic political situation—a trend toward the introduction of certain elements of an authoritarian regime. This is one negative factor. If this were confirmed—and I have the impression that current political developments are confirming these forecasts—we would thus create for ourselves an unfavorable position for our integration into Europe. Another factor is the quite frequent ambiguity of the statements made by certain politicians, first and foremost of whom is the prime minister. This all creates a less than perfect image for the "legibility" of our domestic policy. This, of course, in turn also influences the conclusions that foreign countries come to as far as their relations with our country are concerned."

[Question] Mr. Minister, you have said that you do not want to cause any problems for the president by your resignation—that is, problems with regard to relations between the government and the Castle. Could you expand on this?

[Moravcik] I was mainly emphasizing that it is necessary to deal speedily with the issue of appointing a new minister. This is in the interest of the Slovak Republic, which I consider to be the most important thing. It is not expedient, within the framework of Slovakia's foreign policy interests, to prolong such a state of uncertainty. So, this was my main reason for submitting my resignation.

[Question] It seems to me that the Slovak foreign minister is viewed as follows: Either he is good but not loyal, or he is loyal but not good. Do you think Slovakia needs a good foreign minister or a loyal one?

[Moravcik] I think Slovakia needs a minister who is, despite everything, capable of asserting the Republic's foreign policy interests, interests that are specified objectively and geopolitically. There is sufficient support for this in parliament; our foreign policy line was formulated with the participation of all of the political entities. The foreign minister should respect this and he should assert this line.

[Question] In this case, must he end up like Milan Knazko and you?

[Moravcik] It is necessary to create the domestic political conditions so that this does not happen. I feel that we are going through a period in which the domestic political situation is preventing us, to a broad extent, from implementing our foreign policy interests.

[Question] Could you explain why the visit to Bratislava by your Russian counterpart, Andrey Kozyrev, has twice been postponed?

[Moravcik] The two sides agreed that they would portray the postponement of this visit as a mutual decision.

[Question] Will you be able to give us more details when you are no longer in office?

[Moravcik] I must respect Slovakia's interests abroad, even when I am no longer foreign minister.

[SMENA correspondent] In reply to a question on the future orientation of Slovak foreign policy, Minister Moravcik said the following:

"The orientation of our foreign policy evolved on the basis of a general consensus; it has support in parliament. If someone were to want to alter it, he would obviously meet with resistance in parliament. For this reason, I think that the fundamental line of our foreign policy should and will be maintained."

[Question] Andreas Kohl, general secretary of the European Democratic Union, has said that holding a referendum on the withdrawal of mandates from deputies in parliament is at variance with all norms and democratic criteria and incompatible with Slovakia's membership in the Council of Europe. In your opinion, what could the real repercussions of this situation be?

[Moravcik] I agree with this assessment; this would really be a considerable step backward. The principle proposed in the referendum is incompatible with the political thinking in democratic Europe and is incompatible with the parliamentarianism that has evolved in Europe over several centuries. This is a well tried system, and such an element, if we were to introduce it, would mean its destruction.

[Question] So you think it is possible that Slovakia could be expelled from the Council of Europe?

[Moravcik] I think it is likely that this would be discussed.

[Question] Mr. Minister, in your opinion, is the nonappointment of ambassadors in key Slovak embassies the fault of the Foreign Ministry or were the "brakes applied," in this context, outside the ministry?

[Moravcik] This is a very complicated situation. If the ministry itself had decided on the appointment of ambassadors, all of the posts would have been filled long ago. However, a consensus among three entities—the Foreign Ministry, the government, and the president—is necessary for this.

[Question] Where did it get "tied up" most?

[Moravcik] It is a very long way from the ministry to the president.

[Question] Mr. Minister, you are obviously thinking about establishing a new political entity. In this context, I would like to ask you whether an alliance with—I will say this very pejoratively—the so-called turncoats from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Slovak National Party is possible.

[Moravcik] We will try to consolidate all of the forces oriented toward the center of the political spectrum, including Cernak's National Democratic Party and the Alliance of Slovak Democrats, and, as the case may be, we will also seek other entities. We are thinking about a possible coalition, not a merger, with the social democrats, under the condition that they progress more to the center of the political spectrum. That is the basis. In addition, we will also look for other ways of involving, if possible, some important personalities in political life, people who have such an inclination. I think that a strong center bloc could provide the basis for domestic political stability in Slovakia.

[Question] You say "we." Can you tell us who this is?

[Moravcik] Those of us who came up with the Alternative for Political Realism initiative are keeping in touch.

[Question] Would you like to go into the elections as a bloc with these entities?

[Moravcik] It would be ideal if a common entity were to come into being and if a merger were to take place. If this does not happen, we would consider it effective and expedient, at least, to form such a bloc, which means an electoral coalition.

[Question] Classified material was discussed at a government session a few weeks ago. It was submitted by Deputy Prime Minister Sergej Kozlik, and, according to some reports from the lobbies, it dealt with Slovakia's geopolitical position. Could you be more specific about this material?

[Moravcik] It is classified material, which means I cannot make public its contents; however, I can venture to express an opinion on it. It is so naive and imperfect that it cannot be utilized. It is muddled, and, in my opinion, there is no point in discussing it.

Minister Discusses Republic's Defense Doctrine

AU0403090594 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 2 Mar 94 p 4

[Interview with Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "We Know How To Defend Our Sovereignty"]

[Text] [REPUBLIKA] You will put forward the Slovak Defense Doctrine at the government session. What does this document mean for Slovakia?

[Andrejcak] The defense doctrine is an umbrella document containing the principle issues of our defense philosophy. This means that it does not deal with the way soldiers defend our homeland but with the way the state approaches defense issues, how it will defend its sovereignty, and how our defense policy will be formulated. I think that the defense doctrine guarantees all of this.

[REPUBLIKA] Is this not a bit late? Virtually a year after the state's establishment?

[Andrejcak] Not at all. After all, countries like the United States and Great Britain do not have a defense doctrine like this, and they have been around for quite a while. This is a form that makes public the substance of the Slovak Republic's defense principles. The military part, however, is specific, but that is strictly classified in every country.

[REPUBLIKA] A great deal was once said about a home guard, but the public, in general, was not inclined toward it. What is the situation today?

[Andrejcak] We actually have a home guard. We have home guard brigades and home guard regiments; however, we will assign them only in the event of a defense emergency. The home guard units are part of the ground forces.

[REPUBLIKA] When will the Slovak Defense Doctrine be regarded as an official document? Does it have to be approved by parliament?

[Andrejcak] It would be enough for it to be approved by the State Defense Council, and that has already happened. However, if parliament also wants to approve it, there is nothing preventing this. The National Council of the Slovak Republic committees have already discussed and approved it. However, it is already an official document because the State Defense Council has approved it.

Jeszenszky on B-H Accord, U.S. Visit

LD0303174794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0545 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Martin Kovacs; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Kovacs] How do you evaluate the chances of a settlement in Bosnia in light of the agreement between the Croats and Muslims yesterday?

[Jeszenszky] Well, unfortunately, one has to be cautious because there have already been so many agreements in that region in the past which have not been kept. However, I hope that this will be adhered to, for it is of vital importance for both parties. Since this very significant agreement has been concluded after this tragic and bloody war, this indicates a very serious political intention. Another element also has to be emphasized in the agreement: the Croats and Muslims have also agreed that they will not try to create two ethnically pure Croat and Muslim Bosnias. The fact that the communities will have cultural autonomy while the joint affairs of state will be run together is a very good model.

[Kovacs] You had talks today with the U.S. defense secretary and secretary of state. Did they ask you about the Hungarian position regarding Yugoslavia? Did they ask for any kind of explanation?

[Jeszenszky] No, they did not ask for any explanation and there is no need for that. The Hungarian position was known to them already. I did, however, use the opportunity to illuminate Hungary's special position; that is, our closeness and to a certain extent our vulnerability and the vulnerability of the Hungarians of Vojvodina. Finally, the conclusion was that the United States sees Hungary's special concerns, but it also sees that Hungary has consistently pursued the policies of the past three and a half years. Our policy in the Yugoslav question is quite unequivocal: we support a settlement, we want peace, and this peace should be the fairest possible. [passage omitted]

Hungary's foreign policy is balanced; Hungary gives humanitarian aid to Vojvodina but also to the Serbs living there. Hungary accepts Bosnian refugees and Hungary is forming a new friendly relationship with Croatia, reviving traditions going back centuries. We are confirming these with talks also. I visited Belgrade in January and I am planning to visit Zagreb and Sarajevo also in the near future. So Hungary is able to form good relations with every one of the parties—to varying degrees, naturally—and this is in accordance with the will and expectations of the international community.

[Kovacs] Did you have an opportunity or was there a need to talk about the AWACS planes using Hungary's air space?

[Jeszenszky] There were no need for talks about this. We are in continuous contact with NATO and I know what kind of useful information we receive from these planes. The planes' mandates are unchanged. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] The U.S. State Department has carried out its annual analysis of human rights in every country. This analysis also contained critical elements in connection with Hungary. Did you react to these critical elements? Did you discuss this at all?

[Jeszenszky] These were not mentioned and this itself indicates that these critical elements are not serious enough to create concern in the Government of the United States. As long as this report is much less critical of Hungary than, let us say, of Great Britain, I am not worried. Having said that, there are certain points in this report which do not correspond entirely to the situation in Hungary, or they are rather one-sided, and we shall respond to these at the appropriate level proving precisely the real situation, so we did not have to discuss this issue at this level.

Radio Vice President Explains Staff Cutbacks

LD0403132194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] A total of 129 employees of Hungarian Radio have been dismissed or pensioned off. According to a statement by [Hungarian Radio Vice President] Laszlo Csucs, their names will not be published to respect their personal rights. In his statement issued by MTI, the vice president supported the idea of unbiased public service activity. We quote:

The transformation of the system is under way in Hungary and Hungarian Radio cannot avoid this either. The State Audit Office's investigation, which was carried out in 1992, drew top officials' attention to several shortcomings, though it found financial matters in order. Hungarian Radio prepared a plan of measures that included a plan to reduce overly high staff numbers, which stood at over 2,000 people.

According to Csucs's statement, decisions on redundancies were not based on political, but professional and ethical criteria; that is, Hungarian Radio dismissed those who did not meet these criteria, the vice president's statement reads.

'Political Cleansing' Alleged

LD0403140794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Some Hungarian Radio employees who have not been sacked have started a petition for they consider that an unequivocal political cleansing has taken place in the institution.

In their opinion, the often mentioned surplus of staff does not justify the dismissal of prestigious, experienced, and well-known editors and reporters on the pretext of financial difficulties and organizational restructuring.

These staff members—who are unaffected by the dismissals and have joined the employees' protest—emphasize that they wish to serve the radio listeners. Thus they will remain [in the institution] to carry out the work as long as possible.

They think it important to let everybody know that they consider these events outrageous. They express their solidarity with those sacked and they hope that soon they will be able to work together in Hungarian Radio again.

Government Establishes Special Fund

LD0403141994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Excerpt] The Hungarian Government is to grant Hungarian Radio a special fund [celtamogatas] of 105 million forints, earmarked for wage increases and severance pay, [Government Spokeswoman] Judit Juhasz has confirmed.

The spokeswoman said that the government had passed special decrees on the legal status of public employees at Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television, and the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency [MTI]. People can be appointed to leading positions only for five years in all three institutions. [passage omitted]

Ministry Official Views EU Application

AU0303180794 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 3 Mar 94 p 7

[Interview with Janos Martonyi, state secretary at the Foreign Ministry, by Gabor Lambert and Lajos Pietsch; place and date not given: "There Should Not Be a Domestic Political Debate on the Membership—Interview With Janos Martonyi on Our Application for EU Membership"]

[Excerpts] [MAGYAR NEMZET] On 1 March in Bonn, Prime Minister Peter Boross announced that our application for European Union [EU] membership will be submitted in April. Why this haste, and what do we expect from this step?

[Martonyi] First about the haste. The idea of the application for membership first emerged when former Prime Minister Jozsef Antall visited Brussels. Unfortunately, the association agreement came into force later than we had expected because of the delay in the process of ratification. Finally, it came into force on 1 February, which put the issue of full membership on the agenda. The other element of all this is that work on an expert level has been going on for a long time and we have drawn up the government's integration policy. It was clear from the beginning that, in this integration strategy, one of the questions—although not necessarily the most important one—is the timing of the application for membership. All I am really trying to say is that this process started a long time ago, and domestic political considerations had nothing to do with it. I can state this very definitely.

In our view, this application has to be submitted now. We would lose at least two years if we waited until 1996, when the inter-governmental conference on the future of the Union is held. We must not do this, the deadline of the year 2000 is very important for us. We have always emphasized that the association agreement was a stage on the way to full membership. If we do not continue on this road, and stop at an intermediate stage, then I am convinced that we will find ourselves in an unfavorable situation in 2001-2002. [passage omitted]

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Was the selection of the timing influenced by a subjective element, namely it seems that the current French minister for European affairs [Alain Lamassoure] seems to be more positive about Hungarian membership than his predecessors?

[Martonyi] Indeed, as far as I know, Lamassoure was the first one to verify in the press the Hungarian intention to submit the application for membership. He also said—what we also know—that the Central and Eastern European countries have to be placed on an equal basis politically, but the political, economic, and legal criteria of membership have to be defined. It will be possible to differentiate between the candidate countries on the basis of these criteria. This is the essence of Lamassoure's view. In my view, this is basically favorable for us. [passage omitted]

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Can we hope that, after the association agreement becoming effective and submitting our application for membership, our integration into Europe can be speeded up in other areas, too?

[Martonyi] This is indeed an important connection. In addition to what we have already mentioned, it also has to be seen that one of the roles of the membership application is that it forces both sides (us and the Union) to face up to our historical responsibility. We can do one thing, namely force the other side to make decisions and to give answers. This is something that is very important. If we want to gain the status of official candidate, then we force the European Union to give an answer. We feel that we can also contribute to the thought process that has now begun in preparation for the 1996 conference, and the subject of this is what kind of Europe we want: A more united, efficient, and democratic Europe, or are we envisaging a different kind of integration. At the moment, the debate is on what status the European Union's associate members should have in the West European Union. I always say that we have to try to further the whole process, and rather than forging ahead as an arrowhead, we want to move forward along the whole front. Therefore, I believe that we have to see the connections between the various goals. Unfortunately, we also have to mention that, here and now, in the Eastern European situation, the elements of unpredictability and uncertainty are present and only certain indications of these have surfaced for the time being; and I believe that this whole issue is also a factor that speeds up integration. The Balladur plan can also be one of these factors. One of the reasons I say that we would like

a united Union is because I believe that this is the only solution to the Hungarian national dilemma: On one hand, transferring a significant part of national sovereignty to the Union and a broader application of subsidiarity on the other, which can also help increase the independence of local communities. This has preconditions, and a long and slow process is needed here because Eastern-Central Europe cannot forget its history and tensions overnight. In my view, the Balladur plan has a chance if it tries to help in this. This is very difficult and has to face many obstacles and mistrust, and this includes the Hungarian side. Naturally, we are also afraid that the plan will finally change in such a way that it loses it original essence, namely that we have to find a solution to the national minority issue by listening to the minorities and allowing national minority rights to prevail. This is the essence of the issue. In addition to this, we can also talk about everything. The success of the plan will not depend on us. Undoubtedly, if the Balladur plan is implemented, then this will be a step towards EU membership for all countries.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Which institution will coordinate the Hungarian actions toward the Union after the application is submitted? How will we attune our economic and other legislation with the European Union's legal provisions?

[Martonyi] We already have the answer to this, namely Law No. 1 of 1994, which announced our association agreement, contains a second and a third paragraph stating that, on one hand, the associate agreement has to be taken into account when making international agreements and, on the other—and this is more important—the requirements of coordination and conformity with the Union's laws have to be taken into consideration in all future Hungarian legislation. As an institution, I believe that the basic responsibility belongs to the Hungarian Parliament. A parliamentary decision is needed to submit the membership application—from a legal point of view, this is actually the initiation of an international agreement. This undoubtedly comes under Parliament's sphere of authority. Parliament will also have to decide on specially important issues in the future. In addition to this, the executive power is responsible for carrying the whole process, in cooperation and coordination with Parliament and its committees. Statements of a domestic political nature have indeed appeared in the press. I am asking all participants—if I may put it this way—not to create a domestic political issue out of this, on either side. This is a fundamental interest and it has to be completed; if it is supported by all parties then it is everyone's merit and responsibility, and it should be accepted with a near unanimous parliamentary decision. I note that this would also be very favorable for the assessment of the application because we have always presented this as a national consensus. I believe that we have been justified in doing so because we have always agreed on the essence of this issue with all parties.

Walesa Travels to India on Official Visit

WS0403121794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Stanislaw Grzymski from Delhi: "Walesa in India"]

[Text] The heads of state who visit Delhi are not greeted at the airport. Immediately on landing, President Lech Walesa, his wife, and the members of the Polish Government delegation went to the residence in Rashtrapati (presidential palace).

The official part of the visit began on Thursday [3 March] at 0900 in the courtyard of the Rashtrapati palace, built in 1929 for the viceroy of the British Crown. The building, which has 240 rooms, is now the residence of the Indian president and houses the chancellery and the office of the government. The Polish delegation was greeted by President Shankar Dayal Sharma and Prime Minister Narasimha Rao.

President Walesa announced that Polish-Indian relations need to become more dynamic.

Next, the Polish delegation went to Radzghat, the place where the body of Mahatma Gandhi was cremated; Gandhi was murdered on 30 January 1948, less than a year after India proclaimed its independence. In line with the tradition, Lech Walesa placed a wreath on the memorial plate in the mausoleum and planted a tree in the garden nearby.

Afterward, he met with President Sharma in the Rashtrapati Palace. The presidents discussed, among other things, similarities in striving for independence of Poland and India. Sharma compared Poland's "Solidarity" period to the period when India fought for independence. Walesa stressed that Mahatma Gandhi was a model for Poles to follow in achieving political aims without resorting to force.

President Walesa also met with a group of Indian Parliament deputies, during which both parties discussed economic development. The president also familiarized himself with the system of legislative powers in India, which was based on the British model, but adjusted to Indian reality.

On Thursday, talks were held also by Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski and his Indian counterpart, Dinesh Siagh.

During a party given in honor of the Polish guests by the Indian president, Lech Walesa stated that there are great possibilities for increasing trade cooperation, which, in recent years, has plummeted to a level that does not correspond to the potential and interests of both states.

The visit of the president of the Polish Republic to India aroused considerable interest in Indian business circles. The 3 March issue of THE TIMES OF INDIA, the largest Indian daily, published a report on the situation and economic reforms in Poland, sponsored by companies interested in trade contacts with our country. Under the headline "Welcome His Excellency Lech Walesa and Danuta Walesa," the companies included their offers.

Spokesman Explains Markiewicz's Dismissal

AU0303163494 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 2 Mar 94 p 1

[Article by Rafal Szubstarski: "Markiewicz, Consider Yourself Dismissed"]

[Text] On 1 March, President Lech Walesa dismissed Marek Markiewicz from the post of chairman of the Radio and Television Broadcasting Council, claiming that Markiewicz had violated the law on radio and television broadcasting.

Markiewicz learned of his dismissal at 1345 yesterday [1 March], one hour after a news conference at which he had publicly signed a document awarding PolSat Television a license to operate a nationwide television channel. Loss of the chairmanship of this Broadcasting Council does not mean loss of membership thereof, and Markiewicz is still a member. His duties, however, have been taken over by the hitherto deputy chairman, Maciej Ilowiecki.

Ilowiecki was angry when he heard the news about Markiewicz. "That just shows how democracy works in this country," he said. "The president had no right to dismiss the chairman. That can only be done jointly by the Sejm, the Senate, and the president, and only if the president rejects a report by the Council or the chairman breaks the law on broadcasting. Therefore, I await evidence of such an offense."

Andrzej Drzycimski, the presidential spokesman, said that the decision to recall Markiewicz was dictated by the fact that "Markiewicz had failed to observe the provisions of the law on radio and television broadcasting." According to Drzycimski, the Council wanted to grant PolSat a broadcasting monopoly. "Among the evidence of this is that PolSat was to be awarded a license to operate a nationwide channel and satellite channels at the same time, and was to be allocated regional frequencies," Drzycimski wrote in a communique.

Drzycimski claims that Markiewicz's plan to merge local stations into larger networks is also a violation of the broadcasting law. Drzycimski did not mention PolSat by name but referred to all of the stations owned by Zygmunt Solorz, owner of PolSat. The president has already criticized the Broadcasting Council several times for granting PolSat a nationwide television license.

Drzycimski's communique also mentions the controversial issue of documents on the subject of the companies that were competing for broadcasting licenses. The State Protection Office [UOP] is said to have conveyed these documents to Markiewicz before he made his final

choice as to who would be awarded the broadcasting license. Drzycimski also claimed that Markiewicz was in the possession of material on the subject of some of the broadcasting license applicants that "gives reason to believe that there is a possible danger to state security."

During the news conference, Markiewicz said that the UOP material contained virtually nothing that could disqualify Solorz in the eyes of the Broadcasting Council. He said there was certainly nothing on Solarz in the papers he received from the prime minister before the final choice was made, and nothing in the unofficial material he received from a high-ranking UOP official almost at the very last moment. "This unofficial material, which was not even signed, contained observations that discredited four applicants for the broadcasting license, but Solorz was not one of them. There was some speculation about Solorz. That is all," said Markiewicz.

In the opinion of UOP spokesman Irena Popoff, from all of the documents he had received, Markiewicz could not have known any more about the applicants than the president and the prime minister.

According to the prime minister's press secretary, Ewa Wachowicz, the UOP material supplied to the prime minister did not question PolSat's eligibility to apply for the broadcasting license.

Markiewicz admitted that, on the day the license was awarded, he had held a bitter conversation with the president. Lech Walesa had accused him of accepting a bribe from Solarz. "As a Solidarity member, I find that accusation scandalous," said Markiewicz.

On Tuesday [1 March], at 1500 hours, the Broadcasting Council, already informed of Markiewicz's demise, presented, in the presence of journalists, PolSat representatives with PolSat's broadcasting license. The license was signed by Markiewicz and by the Council's deputy chairman, Maciej Ilowiecki.

Asked to comment on Lech Walesa's negative decision concerning him, Markiewicz said: "As a member of the Broadcasting Council, I am not at liberty to comment on decisions by the head of state. I received news of this decision at 1345, and I acknowledged it, which does not mean that I immediately began to study the broadcasting law. The law says that the president appoints the chairman of the Council but does not say who dismisses him."

Andrzej Zarebski, secretary to the Council, said that the Council has resolved unanimously to petition the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal, and the Sejm to investigate whether the president has the right to dismiss the chairman of the Broadcasting Council. According to Professor Stanislaw Piatek, a media expert, the broadcasting law fails to define the precise manner in which the chairman of the Broadcasting Council is dismissed.

Solidarity Plans Strikes 'Paralyzing' Economy

WS0403121894 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Mar 94 pp 1-2

[Article by B.I.W.: "Solidarity Announces Surprise Strikes"]

[Text] The first strike, a strike of railway workers lasting at least 10 days, is supposed to be one of the "more cumbersome" for the people," the "Solidarity" ["S"] leadership admitted during a Thursday [3 March] press conference.

Passenger trains will be stopped for one day. When will that be? We will find out from the posters at railway stations. At any rate, "on Monday [7 March] people can still travel by train," said Railway "S" head Krzysztof Maminski. A few days following this strike, there is supposed to be "a long strike, blocking freight traffic and thus paralyzing the economy, but it will not be cumbersome to the people."

"S" merely says that the strike action will be conducted by the plants of the metal branch, energy, mining, communications, and railways, as well as selected regions, districts, and enterprises. "S" will not reveal who will go on strike, when, and for how long. It is going to reveal the details no more than 10 hours before the strikes actually begin because "all of the things that have been practiced on the union before are starting all over again." "Traveling all over the country are gentlemen with attache cases who put out strikes and promise wonders," said National Committee Spokesman Piotr Zak.

Asked whether the people will bear the costs of the "S" action, Zak gave assurances that, even though "strikes are always cumbersome," they will try to "limit this cumbersomeness": "One can, for example, imagine limiting energy supplies not to private houses and apartments but only to offices...."

"Will the central administration be paralyzed?" journalists asked.

"Now, has it not been paralyzed already?" replied "S" Head Marian Krzaklewski.

Miners are planning three forms of the strike: They will not go underground; they will, but they will not work, or they will work, but they will not sell the coal. "The purpose of our strike is not to overthrow the government or this political configuration," said Silesian "S" Head Marek Kempski.

On 7 March, the "S" action is supposed to begin with a collection of money for the strikers. Not only "S" members but all of the people participating in the strike will be entitled to remuneration for the strike.

Asked whether the trade union is strong enough to undertake such a large-scale action, Krzaklewski replied that "all of the structures in Poland are going through an

organizational crisis; however, in comparison with others, we are effective; hence the fight with the union." He also evaluated that the determination of the work force is so great that, "if our union and each plant had a strike fund, they would all go on strike."

He is not afraid of chaos. "I am afraid of a 200,000-person demonstration in Warsaw. I would not like the people to go out on the streets; therefore, I prefer that they protest in their plants," said Krzaklewski.

"S" will not conclude any branch or regional agreement, if talks on all-national demands of the entire union are not held. Neither will it respect any agreement signed by the union, if it does not include the all-national demands. Krzaklewski added that, since November 1992, the union had been in collective bargaining with the government, concerning compensation for the costs of living; Silesia demanded that in its strike, and now "S" has the full right to go on a general strike. "This time we will complete our action when decisions, not paper-work agreements, are made."

The Cegielski Factory in Poznan will not take part in the "S" strike. Marek Lenartowski, head of the plant "S," which belongs to the "Network," said that "a strike will pour oil on the flames," and the planned action is "an ambition-dictated activity of the chairman and the union leadership."

'No Strike' on 7 Mar

LD0403121794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1012 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Wroclaw, 4 Mar—At a news conference in Wroclaw today, Tomasz Wojcik, chairman of the Lower Silesian Solidarity Region, stated that there would be no strike action in Wroclaw on 7 March.

Wojcik said that if there were a strike staged at a later date in Wroclaw, the action would be carried out in the most unconventional manner, "which would cause disruption, especially to the authorities." Among other things, there will be disruption in telephone services or cuts in central heating in municipal offices, as well as in those institutions that provide services for the government.

Bank Slaski Share Prices Being Investigated

LD0403114994 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 2300 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Relayed by TV Polonia Network]

[Text] The Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw has begun an investigation into irregularities committed by employees of the Finance Ministry in setting the price of shares of Bank Slaski.

As we were told by prosecutor Ryszard Kucinski, who is leading the investigation, these are, for the time being, proceedings in a case and not against any specific people. The prosecutor's office decided to begin an investigation only after two months from the date that the Confederation of Republicans tabled a formal notice regarding the crime. In the opinion of the confederation, the price of the Bank Slaski shares had been seriously lowered and the Treasury had been the loser.

A second motion asking for an investigation was tabled on 26 January by the Inspection Office of the Stocks Commission. This motion concerned the possible overestimate of the market price of shares at the first two sessions.

Another line of investigation is to answer the question of how the process of setting the share price was carried out.

Unemployment Trends for 1994 Examined

PM0303100194 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 23 Feb 94 p 5

[Article by Teresa Kwasniewska: "Pessimistic Accent: Unemployment in January: Alarming Growth Rate—Employment Offices Register 69,527 More Jobless in January—Forecasts Warn of 3.05 Million Unemployed by End of 1994—Money for Benefits Available So Far"]

[Text] This time, there is no reason to feel optimistic. To date, we have 2,959,100 registered unemployed. This means that, in January, employment offices registered in excess of 69,500 unemployed people more than during the previous month. Is it a seasonal phenomenon? According to Jerzy Szreter, labor and social policy vice minister, it is difficult to formulate an unequivocal hypothesis on the basis of the data available to us at the moment.

The increase in the number of unemployed was registered in virtually every voivodship in the country, with the highest increment in Chelm (6.3 percent) and Krakow (5.3 percent) Voivodships.

Things were bad enough before, but they are getting even worse now. The proportion of unemployed women is on the increase (51.6 percent), as is that of people who are not eligible for unemployment benefits. Of the newly registered unemployed, more than 64,500 are not entitled to receive unemployment benefits (compared with 48,500 in December). This is still the largest group among the total population of registered unemployed.

The only optimistic accent in this situation is that there are a few more job vacancies on the labor market (in January there were 41,171 vacancies, compared to 28,000 in December). At the same time, there is still a tremendous differentiation in this index between different regions of the country. For example, the largest number of unemployed per job vacancy was recorded in the following voivodships: Ostroleka (953), Biala Podlaska (914), and Kielce (814). The best situation in the local labor market was reported in Warsaw (16 applicants per vacancy), Gdansk (37 applicants per vacancy), and Krakow Voivodships.

More than 53,000 jobless were employed in various emergency operations and more than 15,600 in a range of public works. In addition, more than 13,600 people were being trained or retrained for new jobs.

Close observation of the changes that took place in the labor market last year could lead us to expect that a further increase in unemployment figures is again possible in February, while March should see a stemming of the tide, and April should bring a stop to the seasonal surge in unemployment. However, all of these estimates are still based on speculation.

The official announcement of a proposed introduction of a number of new legislative moves brought further confusion into the scene. For example, the announcement that the period of eligibility for unemployment benefits will be extended for people with dependent children in full-time education. A surge in unemployment registrations for a certain social group—namely, sole family breadwinners—has already been noted in employment offices in Lodz.

What are the needs of the national labor market? To begin with, several hundred billion zlotys [Z] for regions under particular threat of unemployment, Z800 billion to finance restructuring projects for the regions of Lodz and Walbrzych, and Z2 trillion for intensification of projects promoting active forms of combating unemployment.

"There is enough money in the kitty for unemployment benefits now, and there will be enough for the future," Minister Szreter assures us. "There is no direct danger that we will run out of funds. Even so, should the situation on the labor market continue to deteriorate sharply and result in an unexpectedly large increase in unemployment figures, we will have one other solution left: simply to curtail expenditure on schemes promoting active forms of combating unemployment (we are not, in any case, statutorily obliged to run them)."

For the time being, the ministry has no available data that would enable experts to establish whether privatization causes increased unemployment. On the one hand, privatization certainly promotes rationalization of employment, and that means reduction in the numbers of work positions. On the other hand, it often poses a dilemma: Should the employer choose to salvage at least half of the existing work positions through privatization, or should he let them all go, thus throwing all employees out onto the streets?

There are more mass layoffs in the state sector, although the time when the private sector forever employed new people and never laid them off is long gone. It is true that many new firms are being created all the time, but just as many are simultaneously collapsing and going bankrupt.

Unfortunately, all attempts to press Minister Szreter to reveal whether the forecasts claiming that by the end of this year we would have, at most, 3.05 million unemployed were at all realistic, met with no success. He failed to answer the question clearly and unequivocally; indeed, he could not have done so because no one can know the answer. All too frequently, unemployment has made it plain that it is an elementary force that can easily defeat all attempts to control it....

Party Leaders Comment on Cabinet Formula

AU0403103494 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 28 Feb 94 p 3

[Report by Marina Roman and Bogdan Tiberiu Iacob on statements by party leaders regarding the government formula: "Will the PDSR, CDR, and PD(FSN) Smoke a 'Peace Pipe'?"]

[Text] CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania]: "We are not interested in participating in the government, but in the application of our anticrisis program!"

PD(FSN) [Democratic Party-National Salvation Front]: "A PDSR government supported by the opposition is possible, but only on the basis of a well-defined political pact."

PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania]: "A PDSR monocolor government is viable, but for no longer than six months."

Last week's meeting of the CDR leaders projected an original, even thrilling, alternative to the forefront of the political arena by bearing in mind the savage post-revolutionary duels between those in power and those in the opposition: the possibility of a political pact between the main parliamentary blocs—CDR, PD(FSN), and PDSR, with a view to supporting a monocolor, reformist government of the ruling party. It is more than obvious that in the current domestic and international situation, this offer of "smoking a peace pipe" would be, from several points of view, the best solution. What remains to be seen—after the negotiations that will soon be held—is to what extent this can be put into practice, because Romania's very future is at stake. Here are some opinions by a few leaders of the parties involved in this question:

Emil Constantinescu, CDR president: "After more than two months of so-called negotiations, the PDSR has reached the conclusion that there is nothing to change and it is proposing a new minority government. Thus we are asking ourselves where is that national interest that even Mr. Adrian Nastase places above party interests, as he says? Only after the PDSR allies had launched an utterly irresponsible blackmail campaign by attacking basic state institutions and extending their vulgar actions to those in power, actions which up to then had served their interests through attacks on the opposition, did the ruling party announce that it might consider a reformist minority government. As far as we are concerned, we are not necessarily interested in participating in government at this time, but in applying the CDR program for coming out of the crisis. The only possible way is to discuss a tangible program with precise elements and deadlines. If we reach an understanding on this, we will be able to form a new parliamentary majority to support an efficient and competent government. Every drawer is full of programs; however, there has been no political will to apply them. And as a consequence of the activity of the current government, something very serious has happened: the political infiltration of the middle echelon! Even if we now came up with a competent government, it would be difficult for it to implement its program because of this middle echelon that has taken shape. Recent differences in the leftist wing have clearly demonstrated the infiltration in this echelon of antireform-oriented people. This is one of the most serious of Romania's problems at this time."

Dinu Patriciu, vice president of the Liberal Party '93: "In no way will we support a PDSR government, because our objections are linked both to the program and to the competence of those whom the PDSR can appoint to the government. When I say competence, I mean it in its broader sense, that is resulting primarily from a certain mentality. And, through its origin and political actions, the PDSR has proved that the mentality of its people does not permit them to think politically in the sense of denationalization, decentralization, debureaucratization, and destablization. We have different aims, and thus we can only have different policies. A PDSR monocolor government would be a catastrophe! As far as Professor Emil Constantinescu's statement is concerned, it is of a personal nature and in no way the result of discussions within the CDR Executive Committee. My opinion is that such a government would not have the necessary parliamentary support. Cars that drive down the middle of the street are in the way of both those on the left and those on the right.

Radu Al. Timofte, PDSR senator: A PDSR minority, monocolor government is as viable as can be but not for a long time. It could not last longer than six months unless a very serious pact is concluded with the other parliamentary parties and unless this pact is observed by its signatories.

Ion Diaconescu, first vice president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party: During the Convention, we decided not to change the attitude that we have had so far, and to preserve our uncompromising stance. We will participate in government only if the PDSR renounces its monopoly on state power. As for parliamentary support, which the CDR and PD(FSN) could grant to a PDSR minority government, I can tell you only that we will support, as we have done so far, only those laws that in our view are objective, beneficial, and reformist, and we will reject the others. Within our alliance, however, there are reservations about a possible so-called opening by the current power toward the opposition."

Adrian Severin, PD vice president: "When we talk about a viable PDSR government, I think that it has to be clear that we are not referring to the current government. We will not support a government against which we have supported two censure motions and two simple motions. A minority, monocolor PDSR government—other than the Vacaroiu government—supported by the current opposition, that is the CDR and PD, is possible, but only on the basis of an explicit political pact that will define the national interests, the ways and means to accelerate

and intensify the reform process, the way to isolate extremist political forces and stop their access to the levers of power, as well as guarantees for the operation of democratic institutions. Such a formula does not mean a political alliance between the PDSR-CDR-PD, but just a way to cooperate at a time of crisis."

PDSR's Break With PRM Examined

AU0403105094 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 28 Feb 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "The Issue of a Minority Government"]

[Text] Recent events have made the fate of the current government coalition really uncertain. Certainly, the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] and the PRM [Greater Romania Party] referred in their public statements only to the issue of freezing negotiations with the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] on forming a new government. They refrained from commenting on their parliamentary alliance with the PDSR, an alliance that resulted in the Nicolae Vacaroiu cabinet. As far as the government party is concerned, it did not adopt a categorical position regarding an alliance with the PSM and the PRM. The response to the PRM letter is a declaration that, although intended for the entire left wing on our political spectrum, its conclusion merely refers to the issue of negotiations aimed at establishing a government of the so called red pentagon. At a first glance one might say that the current signs that relations between the PDSR and the PSM-PRM have cooled refer only to the plan for a PDSR-PSM-PRM-PUNR-PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania] government and will not affect the current discreet alliance, an alliance through which we have today in parliament a left-wing majority coalition. Using a simple metaphor, we might say that the PDSR broke off negotiations for a marriage with the PSM-PRM. However, the engagement is still on. To think in this way strikes me as a little risky. During the quarrel on the issue of negotiations, enough curses were exchanged for not only the marriage but even the engagement to be thrown into doubt. Just as in every dispute, the sides reached a stage when they expressed exactly what they thought about each other. However, in a love affair, any separation starts from the first real quarrel. In that moment, the two sides threw into each other's face everything that they had kept hidden before. And even if they make up later, the memory of that moment of sincerity will seriously affect their relationship. A similar thing will also happen to the government coalition. The controversy on the issue of negotiations aimed at establishing the pentagon gave the partners the opportunity to express what they thought about each other. Not only they but also the public could notice that, beneath the embraces and kisses that have been exchanged so far, serious differences are hidden. At the same time, one should remember something else. The bickering with the PSM-PRM produced an opportunity for certain clarifications within the PDSR. As is known, the PDSR is dominated by disputes between its two groups, namely, the reformist and the conservative ones. As long as the PSM-PRM had cast their eyes at the PDSR, the reformist group did not have a chance firmly to put forward the issue of separation from nationalist-communist forces. Every time the conservative group invoked a reason—which did not lack common sense—namely, that it is preferable to have a stable alliance with the left wing than a hypothetical and uncertain alliance with the right wing. The PRM letter gave the opportunity to the reform group to take its revenge. The hooligan and absolutely irresponsible behavior of [PRM leader] Corneliu Vadim Tudor toward President Ion Iliescu was used by the reformist group to demonstrate to the whole party how dangerous an alliance with nationalist-communists is. Faced with such a shattering argument, the conservative group was compelled to give in. This can be seen in the style and content of the PDSR declaration, which indicates the victory of the position adopted by the reformist group. From this viewpoint, there is no doubt that PRM Leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor has made a decisive contribution to the victory of the reformist group in the PDSR. With his stupid articles, he strengthened that group of the ruling party that had been advocating for quite a long time a break with the left-wing allies and an opening toward the CD and the PD(FSN) [Democratic Party(National Salvation Front)]. Even if neither the PDSR nor the PSM-PRM could comment on the current coalition, it is clear that under these circumstances, its days are numbered. Does a possible break of the left-wing coalition endanger the PDSR's government? Although it might seem paradoxical, the answer is no. The PDSR has every chance to form a government with a minority executive and rule for a while. The fall of the government would depend on the success of a censure motion. However, such a situation would mean early elections. And such prospects frighten not only all the parties but all the members of parliament as well. What member would dare, at a secret ballot required by the censure motion, to vote for the fall of the government and early elections? This would mean to make his future status as a member uncertain. Thus, it is not excluded that in the near future we are going to have a minority PDSR government, supported by both the right and the left wing.

Greek General 'Influenced' Iliescu's Election

AU0303123394 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Feb 94 p 1

[Sorin Rosca Stanescu report: "Accused of Espionage"]

[Text] Last week Traian Basescu, former transportation minister in the Petre Roman cabinet [and currently a member of the Chamber of Deputies for the Democratic Party-National Salvation Front—PD-FSN], voiced accusations unprecedented in Romania's history. According to him, representatives of the executive and the presidential institution passed secret information about the Petromin fleet to Greek intelligence General Nikos Grylakis [name as published]. In that context the PD-FSN deputy named Paul Teodoru, current transportation

minister, and [General] Vasile Ionel, counselor of President Ion Iliescu. The presidential counselor is supposed to have personally handed over a file containing secret information to the Greek general. Basescu claims that the information had been previously obtained from Petromin Director Romanuel Posedaru.

Until now the representatives of the government, as well as those of the presidential institution, have not officially denied anything.

The press remained speechless when it learned about the accusations of such gravity. If the accusations are sustained by evidence, the Petromin-Forum Maritime scandal will eventually be cleared up by simply revealing the details of an espionage affair the perpetrators of which are top officials in Bucharest and Athens.

Here are some details for our readers. The persons directly accused or merely hinted at by Basescu are: General Nikos Grylakis, the man who in 1993 triggered "the scandal of the century" in Athens, Stellos Katounis, owner of the Forum Maritime company, and the Palestinian Fathi Mohamad Taher [name as published], the owner of the Elite restaurant in Bucharest, the Greek business adversary of the previous two persons, the shipping tycoon Iannis Alafouzos, who also owns a number of radio and television networks, while on the Bucharest side of the affair they are Paul Teodoru and General Vasile Ionel. On a secondary plane the names of Konstandinos Mitsotakis, the former prime minister of Greece, Nicolae Vacaroiu, the head of the executive in Bucharest, and Ion Iliescu have also been mentioned.

If Basescu's allegations are true, the center figure of the whole affair is General Grylakis. His career came to an end in September 1993, previous to which he held the office of Prime Minister Mitsotakis' counselor for security and defense issues. Born on the isle of Crete he later graduated from the Military Academy and the War Academy. He was specially trained by the Mossad (Israel's intelligence service.) During the 1967 military dictatorship he was the head of the Greek secret service In 1989 he organized an illegal network to tap the telephone conversations of various Greek political figures and gather information about them. Three years ago he set up the Bureau for Balkan Affairs. He had contacts with many Balkan leaders. He publicly claimed that he supported and influenced things to have Ion Iliescu elected as president. For that service, according to the Greek press, in 1993 he received a medal in Bucharest. Iliescu does not deny this. In the same year Premier Vacaroiu invites him to Snagov to celebrate the conclusion of the Petromin-Forum Maritime deal. He is a friend of Stellos Katounis and the Palestinian Taher (both of whom have very tight business connections with Moscow), and an enemy of Andreas Papandreou, the current Greek prime minister, and of Alafouzos, the influential shipping tycoon, who last September managed to bring General Grylakis to justice.

In the same month [September 1993] our daily already signaled, for the first time, that he is involved in the Petromin-Forum Maritime deal. From first-class Greek sources (who for the time being wish to remain anonymous) we learned that immediately after "the scandal of the century" erupted in Athens, General Grylakis made an unexpected move: In exchange for the extinguishing of the conflict he offered a number of confidential documents to his adversaries. Among those documents was the file referred to by Basescu and which contains evidence regarding the involvement of top Romanian officials in an espionage affair. In those documents Grylakis describes in detail the persons from whom he obtained classified information and how.

Basescu's accusations are so serious that they place the Romanian intelligence services in a difficult position. The Foreign Information Service, the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI], and UM 0215 (the Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Interior) are now compelled to urgently provide answers to the Romanian public.

Article Views Advantages of EC Association

AU0203175294 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 24 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Bogdan Chirieac: "Our Integration—Between Euphoria and Pragmatism"]

[Text] The accord on Romania's association with the European Community—the most important document signed after 1989—was negotiated under the pressure of a deadline. The Trilaterale—Hungary, Poland and the (then) Czechoslovakia—had already concluded their accords one year before Bucharest. As a result, the Romania-EC negotiations that began in May 1992 were concluded very rapidly by sealing the association accord on 17 November 1992 and its initialing on 1 February 1993 in Brussels. The accord will soon become effective after it is ratified by the parliaments of "the Twelve."

The price that had to be paid for such haste is quite high. Romania—at that time considered "the black sheep" of Eastern Europe—was compelled to accept less advantageous association terms than the ones offered to the Trilaterale. As far as commerce with agricultural products is concerned—considered to be the most important hard currency source of East European countries—Romania was coerced to declare itself satisfied with very little, although in that domain it has the largest potential in the whole area. It might be significant that during the negotiations conducted in view of concluding the accord, Frans Andriessen, the EC commissioner in charge of community issues, expressed his "deepest regrets" for the terms imposed on Romania in the agricultural chapter. Being more confident in their own forces, the Trilaterale countries had put up a fierce fight to protect their interests. Dissatisfied with the EC terms, Poland and Hungary in 1991 left the negotiating table, although, as a matter of fact, the offers made to them by the European Community had been much more generous

than the ones made to our country. The favorite countries of the West assessed that they could afford to gamble—and they won.

Surprisingly enough, shortly before the accord on Romania's association with the European Union [EU] is to become effective, the latter radically changed its stance, offering our country an unhoped-for present. During the Athens conference of the EU member states' ministers of commerce, EU High Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan said that the agricultural terms imposed on Romania have to be adjusted to those offered to Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia. Furthermore, Romania should benefit from an even more rapid access to EU markets in order to compensate for its one-year delay compared to "the four."

This is a remarkable change in the EU's stance with respect to Romania. This gesture indicates the fact that the West is not prepared to divide East Europe into "first class" and "second class" countries.

However, pragmatism should prevail over euphoria in the way Bucharest views this unexpected offer made by the European Union. In other words, it will be easier for us to export agricultural products to EU countries, but the problem is whether Romanian agriculture has sufficient quantities of such products. For the time being, owing to the "priceless" contribution of the Ministry of Agriculture, our country has gained the status of one of the major importers of basic agricultural products (wheat, edible oil, and sugar.) The unexpected chance given to us by the European Union should not be missed because that would cause delays in the transition process, as the country would be deprived of one of its major sources of hard currency. It would be a pity if those general terms offered by the European Union would end up the same way the most-favored-nation status did, namely that we chased that status over almost four years just to realize, after we received it, that Romania's economy is not sufficiently ripe to make any substantial bids on the U.S. market.

NATO: Downed Planes From Serbian Krajina

AU0403123494 Paris AFP in English 1226 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Brussels, March 4 (AFP)—The four planes shot down earlier this week by NATO jets over Bosnia-Herzegovina had taken off from south Croatia's rebel Serb enclave of Krajina, NATO military officials said Friday. Two other Serb aircraft which were not attacked in the same incident probably took off from the Serb-controlled town of Banja Luka in northern Bosnia, officials added.

The report confirmed a statement earlier in the day by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. The four Bosnian Serb Super-Galeb planes bombed a military plant at Bugojno and a residential area northwest of the factory before they were shot down by two US F-16 fighters, according to a NATO report cited by the officials. The bombings occurred after the F-16 ordered the Serbs to land.

The two other Super-Galeb probably bombed an ammunition plant and a fuel depot at Novi Travnik in central Bosnia, the report added. One of the two aircraft probably landed at Ubdina in Krajina, and the other at Banja Luka.

They had been spotted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's AWACS radar planes near Banja Luka and were later visually recognized by the F-16 pilots.

NATO officials had earlier identified the aircraft as Super-Galeb bombers belonging to the Bosnian Serbs but the NATO report made no mention of the plane's origin. No parachutes were spotted after the four planes were shot down, so the fate of the Super-Galeb pilots was unknown, the report said.

Tudjman, in a meeting in Zagreb with special United Nations representative Yasushi Akashi, complained that UN forces monitoring Krajina were exercising "inadequate control." "The example of the Serb military planes that were shot down, and which had taken off from an area of Croatia under UN protection, proves it," Tudjman argued, according to the news agency HINA.

Rose on Lack of Response to Troop Appeal

AU0403102894 Paris AFP in English 1001 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Vitez, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 4 (AFP)—The UN commander in Bosnia on Friday voiced "disappointment" over the lack of response to an urgent UN appeal for more troops in Bosnia and warned it could "make things fail."

"Obviously, it's a disappointment," said British Lieutenant General Michael Rose who Thursday [3 March] said his troops now were operating only "on a wing and a prayer." "I asked for at least 5,000 men, and if we assume that we are going to stay on here for months, obviously I need even more than that," he said. When asked how many reinforcements he had actually been promised, he said only "not many." [passage omitted]

Despite continuing peace efforts that have led to a Serb artillery pullback around Sarajevo and a separate US-brokered Moslem-Croat accord, Rose expressed concern. "There are difficulties, in some way increasing difficulties, in terms of ceasefire violations going on at the moment," he said without giving specifics.

He said the war continued in the central Bosnian city of Maglaj, where a tiny Moslem enclave is under attack by Bosnian Serb forces. The Bosnian Serbs have repeatedly refused to allow in an aid convoy with 100 tonnes of relief supplies for some 19,000 residents trapped in the Moslem enclave in what are described as dire conditions.

"It's not an easy business. They are not giving us the freedom of movement we require. There is a war going on there in Maglaj. We're not in the business of imposing a peace through force," he said. [passage omitted]

Rose did not venture any date for when the airport in Tuzla, the Moslem enclave besieged by Serbs in northern Bosnia, would be reopened. The airport has been closed for more than a year but Bosnian Serbs agreed to allow its reopening for humanitarian shipments to the desperate surrounding region after Russia, a traditional Serb ally, offered to send observer troops there.

Rose said the airport's reopening now only depended on technical details. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic "has now accepted the reopening of the airport. It's just a question of looking into the mechanics, moving the observers up there and some extra troops. I don't think there is a problem, just a question of our own timing," he said.

Rose arrived in the central Bosnian town of Vitez, a Croat enclave besieged by the mainly Moslem Bosnian army, Thursday night to visit the British UN base there which notably houses the First Coldstream Guards.

Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Fikret Muslimovic of the Bosnian army, who negotiated the arrangements to be introduced Saturday, said that more international troops were needed to enforce the Moslem-Croat ceasefire.

Muslimovic, speaking by phone from Zenica in central Bosnia, said the UNPROFOR force was not large enough to keep the peace between Moslems and Croats, who are confronting each other over large tracts of territory. "It won't be possible," he said, if more troops do not come.

UNPROFOR has about 14,700 troops in Bosnia, 4,100 of them in Sarajevo where they are tied up enforcing a separate ceasefire between the Moslems and Serbs.

UN envoy for Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi said Thursday that 10,000 more troops are needed but the United

States has ruled out sending soldiers while France and Britain, with infantry already in Bosnia, are reluctant to provide more.

Muslimovic said Moslem-Croat fighting could end "if there is political will," but he added, "one thing is sure, that the number of (UN) troops now on the ground is not enough."

British UNPROFOR in Ljeskovica Shelled

LD0403133394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Report by Anton Mrkonjic in Zepce]

[Excerpt] At 0635 this morning three 82-mm mortars fell on the British UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] base in the village of Ljeskovica, between Zepce and Zavidovici [central Bosnia, around 100 miles northwest of Sarajevo]. British forces commander Major Darling informed the command of the 111th HVO [Croatian Defense Council] Brigade that their radar equipment detected the direction and even the location from where the mortars were fired, but declined to say who was responsible for the shelling of the British battalion. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but material damage is huge. Maj. Darling said that if the shelling happens again he would demand air strikes against those who fire shells on UNPROFOR. [passage omitted]

Karadzic Assesses Confederation, Moscow Visit

AU0303220594 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Report by Jelena Vidic—recorded]

[Text] [Vidic] President [of the Srpska republic] Karadzic assessed that the visit to Moscow was very significant and that the resolution of the Bosnian crisis will take a new direction.

He assessed that Russia's involvement in the search for a peaceful solution is of crucial importance and that the balance of powers has now been restored on the international scene. Russia is not returning to the international scene in the sense of confrontation with the West, but in the sense of a very active role in the process of searching for a solution to the crisis, Karadzic said and assessed that the Serbian side, as he said, has finally found somebody through whom it can articulate its views and point to what is totally unacceptable for it.

When we asked him whether we can now expect a concrete new Russian initiative regarding the conflict in Bosnia, Karadzic replied:

[Karadzic] I think that the Russians will work in sync with others. It seems to me that at least two moves so far—Yeltsin's letter regarding heavy arms to [Serbian] President Milosevic and via him to me, and now this about the Tuzla airport—have surprised western circles. It seems to me that Russia has accomplished a considerable advantage here, on the basis of which it can now take part in the resolution of the crisis on an equal footing. I expect and assume that meetings similar to those in Washington will also happen in Moscow.

[Vidic] Karadzic then commented the Washington agreement on the Muslim-Croatian confederation:

[Karadzic] We are still studying this agreement and we are not sure yet whether it has been struck at the expense of the Serbs or as a partial step toward peace. We fear any sort of Croatian-Muslim coalition, we remember them from World War II and from the beginning of this war, and for this reason we are very cautious. If they form a joint state then we must also take care of our territories and borders. They must be easily defendable in case this country, this neighbor, starts displaying hostile feelings toward us. In principle, we think that it is not good that the United States has assumed the role of the United Nations, and has taken the place of the international institutions, so to speak, with the great ambition of helping along an agreement of the Croats and Muslims only. I am afraid that the United States is missing another opportunity to portray itself as objective. Therefore, the impression of its partiality and orientation against the Serbian interests is strengthening.

[Vidic] The next steps of the Srpska republic will be to strengthen peace on all front lines in order to negotiate in the best possible atmosphere, Karadzic said. We will participate in all negotiations, however, we have reserves toward those who act as arbiters and neglect the significance of the Serbian side in this conflict. We will not allow the realization of the Croatian-Muslim coalition and joint state to the detriment of the Serbs, Karadzic emphasized.

Commenting on [Croatian Foreign Minister] Granic's invitation to the Serbs to enter the confederation, Karadzic said that the Croatian Minister should have said this in Belgrade and not in Paris.

Karadzic then replied to a question about the decision to open Tuzla airport:

[Karadzic] We have never opposed the opening of the airport for humanitarian purposes. Our fundamental concern was that the airport could be abused for military purposes. We have held very fruitful talks regarding this in Russia and received assurances that the arrangement that we had agreed with the Russians protects against any sort of misuse of the airport. In such a case, we have nothing against the opening of the airport. [end recording]

Comments on U.S., Russian Efforts

LD0303223794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2111 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] Belgrade, 3 Mar (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, said in a statement upon returning from Moscow that the settlement of the

crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina would from now on "take a completely different turn." During a news conference, the Srpska republic president said Russia's complete involvement in efforts to settle the crisis and the establishment of a balance of forces in the international scene were of paramount importance.

"Russia," said Karadzic, "is returning to the international scene not to confront the West, but as a very active factor in the process of seeking a solution to the crisis."

Asked whether a new concrete initiative can now be expected on the part of Russia in connection with the conflict in Bosnia, Karadzic said the Russians "will act in coordination with the others." He also said at least two of Russia's moves—the settlement of the crisis in Sarajevo and the opening of Tuzla airport—have surprised Western circles.

"It seems to me that Russia gained considerable advantage points on the basis of which it can now take part in the efforts to resolve the crisis on an equal footing. I expect and I suppose that meetings will now take place in Moscow similar to the ones in Washington," said Karadzic.

Commenting on the Washington agreement, Karadzic said it was still being analyzed in the Srpska republic and it was not yet certain whether the agreement was being drawn up to the detriment of Serbs or it was a partial step toward peace.

"If they form a joint state, we also have to take care of our territories and borders. They have to be easy to defend in the event our neighbor becomes hostile," Karadzic stressed.

"In principle it is not good that America has taken over the UN's role and it has replaced international institutions with the great ambition to work out an agreement only between the Croats and Muslims," Karadzic said.

He added: "I am afraid that America is losing yet another opportunity to show itself to be impartial. Therefore, the impression that it is biased and that it is against Serbs is being confirmed."

He specified that the next step by the Srpska republic would be to strengthen peace on all front lines in order for negotiations to take place in the best possible atmosphere, and that the Srpska republic would not allow the formation of a Croatian-Muslim coalition and their joint state at the Serbs' expense.

Talking about the decision to open Tuzla airport, Karadzic said the Serb side had never opposed the opening of the airport for humanitarian purposes, and the deal agreed with the Russians ensured that the airport would not be abused.

Russian 'Experts' Heading for Tuzla

AU0403130094 Paris AFP in English 1237 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Zagreb, March 4 (AFP)—Twenty-five Russian experts arrived here Friday headed for the Bosnian city of Tuzla, whose airport the UN plans to open to relief flights under a Russian-brokered accord with the Serb besiegers, the Russian embassy said.

The experts are to visit the airport, which Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said Tuesday in Moscow they had agreed to reopen after almost two year's closure. Under the agreement, Russian observers are to guarantee the airport is not used to bring military supplies into the northeastern city.

The Russian delegation held talks at UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) headquarters after their arrival in the Croatian capital, an UNPROFOR spokesman said. The delegation includes officials from the Russian Ministry for Emergencies and is headed by Sergey Kudinov [name as received], the spokesman added.

UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi said Thursday [3 March] however that the Moscow agreement was not enough since it had not been approved by the Moslem-led Bosnian Government. Akashi said the UN wanted all parties to agree before the airport was opened, but that the UN was determined to open it "even without an agreement, if necessary."

Russians Seen as Tuzla Protectors

LD0303234694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2019 GMT 3 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 3 (TANJUG)—Col. Momir Zec of the Bosnian Serb Army assessed that the decision to allow opening of the Tuzla Airfield "was a good move by the military and political leadership" of the Bosnian Serb state, the Republic of Serbia (R.S.) [in Bosnia-Herzegovina], as "the announced NATO threats were being removed" in this way.

The Russian forces, which will control the airfield at this northeastern Bosnian town under Moslem control, will prevent its possible abuse, said Col. Zec to the R.S. news agency SRNA Thursday.

The accord on opening the airfield at Tuzla was [word indistinct] Tuesday during the talks of R.S. President Radovan Karadzic with Russian ranking officials in Moscow.

The Bosnian Serbs accepted for the Tuzla airfield to be opened for humanitarian aid on condition Russian monitors carry out control as the Serb side feared the airfield could be used for bringing in arms and military equipment to the Bosnian Moslems.

U.N. Undersecretary for Peace Operations Kofi Annan said recently that the U.N. planned the opening of the Tuzla airfield for March 7 in an operation which could involve also NATO air support, while French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe recently threatned the Bosnian Serbs with air strikes if they prevented the opening of the airfield.

Serbs Remain Cautious

LD0303172194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1413 GMT 3 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 3 (TANJUG)—Serb military sources in eastern Bosnia welcomed the decision of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to open Tuzla airport and Russian guarantees that its observers would monitor the airport.

The commander of the Serb forces in the territories east of Tuzla, Colonel Momir Zec, has said that the Serb forces, regardless of the agreement which allows humanitarian flights to Tuzla, are keeping a close watch on the airport.

Col. Zec Told Belgrade daily POLITIKA that the top Serb military officials were not surprized by the decision to re-open the Tuzla airport.

"This is a political move which removes the NATO threats and, within such a compromise, it suits us better to have Russian troops supervize the airport," Col. Zec explained.

The whole issue of the Tuzla airport has been discussed by the media for the past seven months, the Colonel recalls. It is an artificial, extremely politicized construction, allegedly aimed at facilitating the supply of relief aid. it is obvious that some Western countries want to neutralize the arms embargo resolution on Bosnia and use the airport to supply the Bosnian Moslems with arms.

The Tuzla airport is 5-6 km away from Serb front lines, Col. Zec said. it is in poor condition. The runway, which was damaged, is being repaired, but not the airport buildings.

Colonel Zec also denied some agency allegations that the Bosnian Serbs bombarded Tuzla 3 days ago, immediately after the downing of the four aircraft near Banjaluka. "We do not bombard Tuzla. We only respond to Moslem provocations, but our actions are aimed strictly at military targets," Colonel Zec said.

Since the beginning of the war, two years ago, there have never been large-scale battles between the Serbs and Moslems in and around Tuzla. 14,000 Serbs still remain in the town, but the Moslem authorities refuse to allow them to leave.

Commentary on 'Russian Factor'

AU0303205494 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb-4 Mar 94 p 2

[Commentary by Mirko Sagolj: "Russians Did Not Come by Chance"]

[Text] The decision of Milosevic's and Karadzic's (general staff) to withdraw their heavy artillery placed around Sarajevo before the ultimatum expires, and the way in which Russia is (again) getting involved in solving the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, is a shock to many. What is especially confusing is the Russian initiative that actually boils down to protecting the Serbs in the Balkans, thus securing an indispensable role for Moscow in solving Balkan conflicts. It seems that fate would have it that the Russians on one side, and the United States and Great Britain on the other meet exactly 49 years after the Yalta Conference, where former Yugoslavia was divided into two interest spheres precisely on the slopes of Trebevic above Sarajevo. Yalta was betrayed only in that the demarcation line was moved from the Drina River to the Miljacka River, hoping that this is only temporary.

The appearance and role of Russian soldiers around Sarajevo could confuse and shock only those who are not well acquainted with Russia and its inner regularities and do not know what is now happening in this country. Every realistic and proper analysis would, however, show that events around Sarajevo, as the key military and political point of Serbian aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the presence of Russia in these parts are evolving according to all rules of logic.

The Russian initiative could have come as a surprise, first of all, to those who think that the Russian factor became extremely weak and negligible in December, 1991, when Boris Yeltsin disbanded the omnipotent Communist Party of the Soviet Union with two presidential decrees, eliminated communists from power, and then disbanded the great "socialist empire"—the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Federation had 15 federal republics, spread over 22.4 million square kilometers, had 290 million inhabitants, a mighty army, and ruled over a good part of Europe.

According to all formal indicators, it was a superpower that both the United States and China feared. However, it is fortunate for such a superpower that its strength in the past 50 years was tested in peace, and it was lucky not to have engaged in military conflicts against the West. If it had been put on the battlefield against the West, it would have become obvious that it was a colossus with feet of clay; with a great potential, it is true, but with an enormous question mark as to its use.

This evaluation is first of all based on the character of former authorities in the Soviet Union, which most of the inhabitants were not satisfied with, as well as on the very structure of the Soviet Federation. The fact that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, not a single former federal republic wanted to stay in the same country with

Russia, best portrays the strength of the entire Soviet Federation. And that could be explained: None of the former Soviet federal republics joined the federation in a democratic manner, of its own will. They all became its members mostly in times of war and under presence from Russian tanks. If such a Soviet Union had fought a war with a more serious opponent, most of its republics would have turned their backs on Russia. How accessible was the tissue of the former Soviet military, regardless of all the stomic might, a German sports pilot Mathias Rust showed in the most convincing manner when, on 28 May, 1987, he landed at Moscow's Red Square without any problems whatsoever. During World War II, the Germans made daily advances of up to 45 kilometers on Soviet territory. Perhaps they would advance even faster in 1991.

Regardless of the fact that Russia left the Soviet Union waving the white flag—almost ravaged materially, ideologically, politically, and morally speaking—it is still more powerful than the former Soviet Union, and definitely more dangerous. It is indeed a very complex and heterogeneous state structure, according to the national composition of its inhabitants, but it is far more homogenous and "coordinated" than the former Soviet Union, and that is its true strength. It is more dangerous because empty spaces on its political scene, vacated when the communist were overthrown, are now mostly filled by social national demagogues, who promise people they will return both Vodka and the glory and homogenize them around that idea. Such a Russia not only does not want to give up any strategic point of its interests and influence, but wants to strengthen them. And Trebevic and the "orthodox brothers in the Balkans" are primary Russian interests, and their presence in these parts and their role should be viewed in this light.

In former Russian views regarding the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ways to solve it, there were significant differences. There are no more such differences: The Russian parliament, with all its factions, without exceptions, the Russian public, President Yeltsin, its government, they all point out that there is no solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina without Russia and that they are against using force against Serb positions.

The world is, therefore, facing Russia again; last time it was faced with communism as an ideology and now with Zhirinovskiy.

Agreement Allows UN To Patrol Frontlines

AU0403135994 Paris AFP in English 1342 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, March 4 (AFP)—Bosnian Croats and Moslems have given the green light for UN troops to patrol frontlines between the two groups as talks were to open in Vienna Friday [4 March] aimed at working out details of their proposed federation.

UN patrols due to start as early as Saturday will be accompanied by unarmed Croats and Moslems, said Major Rob Annink, a spokesman for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Starting Saturday talks will also be held on opening up six routes to cross the frontlines.

The report comes a day after Bosnian army General Muslimovic and his counterpart, General Vrbanac of the Bosnian Croat HVO [Croatian Defense Council] force, agreed on the terms of the patrols.

UN peacekeepers will be deployed immediately at the Croat-Moslem hotspots of Mostar, Vitez, Gorni Vakuf, Prozor, Konjic, and Jablanica where ceasefire violations have been rampant, said UNPROFOR spokesman Major Guy Vinet. Under the Moslem-Croat agreement all checkpoints manned by HVO and Bosnian army troops will come under UN control, Vinet added. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile in Vienna, representatives of the Moslem-led Bosnian government and Croats were due to open talks at the U.S. embassy at 3:30 p.m. (1630 GMT) Friday on the fineprint of how to establish a federation.

Bosnian Justice Minister Kasem Trnka will head the government delegation while the Croat delegation will be headed by Deputy Croatian Foreign Minister Sanader Ivo. U.S. special envoy on ex-Yugoslavia Charles Redman will also attend.

A high-level transitional committee has been charged with drafting a constitution for the Croat-Moslem federation as well as the outlines of a confederal arrangement linking the proposed alliance with the Republic of Croatia.

The committee in addition will try to forge a military accord between Bosnian Moslems and Croats and an agreement on the shape of governmental structures in the proposed federation. The talks here are expected to last around 10 days. [passage omitted]

Weapons To Be Collected

LD0403145794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Croat and Muslim forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina have agreed to allow Unprofor forces to begin patrolling demarcation lines as of tomorrow, Commander Rob Anning, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] spokesman in Sarajevo said today.

The agreement was reached in Gornji Vakuf today between representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army led by General Muslimovic, and the Croat Defense Council led by General Vrbant, Anning said.

Talks on the opening of six roads crossing the front lines are due to start at the same time. These measures should enable the implementation of the general cease-fire agreement and the collection of weapons, which should come into effect at 1200 on 7 March. Weapons are to be collected in five or six locations under UN supervision.

SDA Members on Agreement

AU0303181394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] The Bosniak-Croat agreement represents a victory for those Bosniaks who remained faithful to the program paved by the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]. This was stated today, among other things, at a news conference by the SDA. On behalf of the SDA, correspondents were addressed by Edhem Becakcic, a member of the SDA Main Committee; Dr. Fahet Halilovic, president of the Sarajevo Municipal Committee; and Muhamed Kupusovic, a member of the municipal committee. Edin Muhic has more details:

[Begin recording] [Muhic] The main topics of today's SDA news conference were the Bosniak-Croat agreement and the UN administration of the wretched Sarajevo. Edhem Becakcic spoke on the SDA's stance on the international community initiatives for resolving the Sarajevo issue:

[Becakcic] The SDA accepts administrative assistance to the legal authorities of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina in restoration and reconstruction of [word indistinct] of the Bosnia-Herzegovina capital. Demilitarization is a victory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which was defending and managed to defend all of Sarajevo's residents and which agreed to the lifting of the artillery blockade of Sarajevo after it has successfully endured attacks of enormous artillery [words indistinct] aggressor.

[Muhic] The Bosniak-Croat agreement is a better solution than all previous draft agreements on Bosnia-Herzegovina's internal organization, president of the SDA municipal committee Fahet Halilovic stated. At the beginning, he emphasized the positive segments of this agreement:

[Halilovic] These are: coalition, the right to veto, proportional representation, and the autonomy of cantons. This is actually a model that [word indistinct] so far the most perfect solution for these mixed, complex societies.

[Muhic] It is also positive in that the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis is trying to be resolved by political means in this way. One of the negative implications of this agreement is that the independence of administrative units could be used by some [word indistinct] forces as the basis for further ethnic cleansing. Asked by a correspondent whether the agreement makes allowances for such occurrences, Dr. Halilovic replied that there is a possibility that in the ethnically cleansed environments the fascist elements would try to [word indistinct] the actual situation. This agreement limits the possibilities for such occurrences; however, the actual situation unfortunately often deviates from a normative agreement.

Regarding the problem of a UN administration of Sarajevo, Dr. Halilovic says:

[Halilovic] What must be emphasized is that the duration of the UN administration is strictly limited, as we must insist on this—namely two years. What the administrator must do is secure the integrity of the town of nine communes, with the exception of Pale, which was treated differently even in the Vance-Owen plan. No solution can be vested in this way if a plebiscite of the residents is not carried out throughout the entire territory of Sarajevo, in all communes.

[Muhic] The plan that envisaged a union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina from last August has been surpassed, Muhamed Kupusovic, a member of the municipal committee and president of the Sarajevo Executive Council, emphasized:

[Kukusovic] I would like to emphasize one point, and that is that certain factors of this plan have nevertheless remained—namely, in the coming talks and combinations to resolve the problem of Sarajevo, Pale has been excluded as the town's commune.

[Muhic] Edhem Becakcic was asked whether the Bosniak-Croat agreement represents the partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina in two parts. He replied that such a partitioning is out of the question, and that time will show how the problem of the territories controlled by Karadzic's Serbs will be resolved. [end recording]

'Impossibility' of Federation Viewed

LD0303181794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1342 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Article by Sinisa Ljepojevic]

[Text] Belgrade, March 3 (TANJUG)—Initial analysis and reactions to the just-signed agreement on the creation of a Croat-Moslem federation in the ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, underscore the idea's serious drawbacks and the almost certain impossibility of its realization since the agreement does not take reality into consideration and eliminates from the game the Serbs, the key factor in Bosnia.

What is the reality in which the Croat-Moslem federation should exist.

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the local Croats and Moslems have over the past year been waging a war whose brutality exceeds all previous conflicts in this region. This is why it is difficult to believe that such opponents will so easily and simply agree to forget everything and start anew.

In its first reactions on Thursday morning, Moslem Sarajevo radio cited its Mostar correspondent who said that, after everything, life alongside the Croats in this city will not be possible.

Both the Bosnian Croats and Moslems have already carried out ethnic cleansing in territories they control, while the property of those who managed to survive and

flee to other parts of ex- Yugoslavia, has almost completely been destroyed. The agreement, however, calls for all to return home.

Under the agreement, a single Croat-Moslem army will be created from the existing officer ranks, while all foreign armies, including the U.N. troops, will withdraw from the territory of the Croat- Moslem federation.

All further comments about this are unnecessary.

The agreement also fails to say which territories are in question and it is assumed that the Serb side will give up to the Moslems what was promised.

However, promises were made within the European Union's plan for the division of Bosnia into three ethnic states, so that this assumption, as well as the entire agreement, were made without consulting the Serbs.

Washington's concept is to create a dual state and thus enable the Moslems to preserve, even partially, the unity of Bosnia- Herzegovina, to extend their territories, to secure access to the Adriatic Sea and set up a strong negotiating (even possibly military) block against the Serbs in the forthcoming talks.

Since the sponsor of the agreement, the United States, interprets it as a path towards a peace solution, one wonders what stand will the Serb side take.

Initial Bosnian Serb reactions are that the agreement is acceptable in general, but only if it is not aimed against them.

It remains to be seen whether the Serbs will agree, as is hardly likely, to enable the creation of the Moslem-Croat federation in whose forming they did not take part.

The only logic in all this would be that the West is interested in linking up with the Moslem territories in Bosnia, via Croatia and its sponsors, and thus isolating it from possible fundametalist influences of the Islamic countries.

This then gives rise to the question who is the real friend of the Bosnian Moslems, who are of Slav origin.

The Washington agreement has primarily defeated the Moslem idea on the unity of Bosnia by linking them, via the Croats, to the influential Catholic church and opening up the road towards the loss of the Moslem ethnic and cultural identity.

It is now being revealed that only the Bosnian Serbs wanted a Moslem state and were only ones who were not opposed to it.

Basically, all agreements are good if they aim for peace, but the Washington one has slim chances since it eliminates the key factor—Serbs.

Srpska Commander on Readiness To Help UN

LD0403002694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2239 GMT 3 Mar 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Sarajevo, March 3 (TANJUG)—Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army General Ratko Mladic on Thursday promised maximum help to Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina General Michael Rose, whom he described as a "man of profession who is doing his best to restore peace in the area of Sarajevo and in other parts."

After talks with General Rose in Sarajevo's Serb suburb of Lukavica, General Mladic stressed the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had placed their most important [word indistinct] in the Sarajevo area under U.N. control and expressed satisfaction that the UNPROFOR commander was "aware that the Moslems have again breached agreement and declined to withdraw any part of their infantry."

"I think it is good that General Rose insists on a balance of power and urges that the Moslem side should make reciprocal moves," he added.

"I hope UNPROFOR will influence the Moslems to realize that they cannot expect the peacekeepers or NATO to wage war for them and that they should come to the negotiating table and settled disputes by political means. Before that, I don't believe anybody could guarantee the realization of their crazy idea about a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional or Islamic country on Serb territory," Mladic said.

The agreement reached by the Croats and Moslems to form a federation in Bosnia is welcome if it is striving towards peace but it would not be good if this is not the case, said General Mladic.

"We are ready for both," he said and added that the avoidance of the Moslem military commanders to meet with the Serb side indicated that they were still hoping to get somebody on their side to fight for their goals.

Top military officers of the Bosnian Serb and Moslem armies were expected to meet at Sarajevo airport on Thursday to discuss ceasefire and free movement of civilians in the Sarajevo area but Moslem Commander Rasim Delic did not arrive to the meeting.

After talks with Mladic, General Rose voiced optimism in view of the restoration of peace in Sarajevo.

Rose said the bridge linking the Serb suburb of Grbavica and the Moslem part of Sarajevo was now open only for UNPROFOR troops and vehicles.

Talks on free passage of vehicles of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are also under way, he added.

Serbs Refuse UN Battalion Access to Srebrenica

LD0403122994 Hilversum Radio Netherlands in English 1130 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Bosnian Serb authorities are refusing to allow a convoy of the Dutch United Nations battalion to get through to the besieged Muslim enclave of Srebrenica. The Serbs are protesting about the amount of military equipment, especially ammunition, that the Dutch troops are taking to Srebrenica. The Serbs are also preventing 180 Canadian troops from leaving the Muslim enclave.

The Dutch contingent is authorized to relieve the Canadian blue helmets under an agreement signed by several parties including the Bosnian Serbs. At first the takeover operation encountered no resistance, but in the past few days the Serbs have toughened their stance.

Serb Forces in Srebrenica Demilitarized Zone

AU0303200994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] The forces of the Serbian aggressor this afternoon took up positions in the area of Podravanje, which is situated within the demilitarized zone of Srebrenica.

Serbs Attacking Maglaj; Fighting Escalates

AU0403103094

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 4 March carries in its regular 8-minute newscast the following reports on the fighting in the republic.

Maglaj correspondent Hajrudin Sermic reports that "the fighting on the Maglaj front has been escalating minute by minute since the early morning hours. The chetniks are relentlessly carrying on with their attacks on the free territory and its defenders. At the moment, all types of artillery and antiaircraft weapon shells are pounding the positions of the 201st Chivalrous Brigade and other [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] units and are an introduction to infantry attacks on the (?Hedrovace)-Siprage-(?Tresjiste) line and the region of Nekolj. Civilian targets in the town and surrounding villages are also not spared. Dozens of howitzer and mortar shells have already hit and destroyed residential and business buildings. This is the tenth day that the population has been in shelters."

Hamid Deronjic reports from Brcko and says that "the shelling of the free Brcko territory defense lines continued overnight. Vranovaca, Djukici, and Kladje were targeted by 80-mm and 82-mm enemy mortars. From the direction of Brod, the chetniks opened fierce Praga and machine gun fire at the defenders' positions on the central sector of the front. Overnight, all the free Brcko territory defense positions came under intensified fire from enemy infantry weapons. The air corridor over the temporarily occupied Brcko continues to be used in the continuing aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Between 1800 [1700 GMT] and 1900 last night, three overflights of enemy transport helicopters were registered on the Brcko-Kicevo route; at 2045, another chetnik helicopter was sighted flying the same route."

Reporting from the Bosna Operative Group Press Center in Zavidovici, correspondent Viktor Boban says that "it seems that the Washington agreement is taking hold in the Bosna Operative Group operational zone, because the confrontation lines with the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] have been mostly calm, which is not the case with the lines facing the Serbian aggressor. The defenders at Mahoje were the target of small arms and antiaircraft machine guns, and some time after 1200, 10 82-mm mortar shells fell in the wider area of Hajdarevici. The night was calm, with only sporadic small arms fire. The exception was the area of Hajdarevici, where several 82-mm mortar shells landed before midnight. Minor chetnik regrouping and movements of heavy armored combat vehicles from Mt. Ozren have been sighted. It is quiet this morning on all the stable defense lines in the Bosna Operative Group operational zone."

Enes Rastusic reports from the 4th Corps Information Center on the situation on the Mostar front. He says that the "past 24 hours in the 4th Corps operational zone were marked by sporadic small arms and antiaircraft provocations along all defense lines. The cease-fire was particularly violated in the southern parts of the Mostar Commune, the free Prozor territories, and in Konjic. Our defenders are consistently observing the cease-fire and did not respond to enemy provocations. Personnel of the 4th Corps thwarted an attempt to infiltrate a [word indistinct] reconnaissance and subversion group in the region of (?Bijelimic). The demarcation lines remain unchanged and under the control of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units."

'Bestial' Destruction Continues

AU0403111094

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1000 GMT on 4 March carries in its regular 4-minute newscast two reports updating the fighting in the republic.

Mirudin Aldobasic reports from the 7-South Operative Group Information Center saying that "overnight and in the early morning hours the aggressor continued his bestial destruction of residential areas in the Maglaj and Tesanj regions, and the free territories of Doboj and Teslic. In addition to this, he is relentlessly attacking the 133 km long defense lines in this area. The chetniks also attacked Tesanj and its outskirts. They attempted infantry breakthroughs in the area of Cerik and Jelicev Gaj, situated in the wider region of Miljanovci, but their attempts were thwarted. Over 100 enemy troops were put out of action in last night's battles on the Teslic-Tesanj defense line, 30 of whom were killed. In addition to this, they [Serbs] shelled civilian targets in the Tesanj region, particularly Mrkotic, Planje, and Radrsa. These

attacks and the chetnik devastation are still in progress." He adds that "there was also fierce fighting in the Doboj region. One of the enemy's terrorist-subversion groups infiltrated the area of Mravici, Karusaj, and Matuzici, but it was quickly discovered and destroyed. This morning, the brave members of the 203d Motorized Brigade Doboj-Bosna repelled fierce enemy infantry attacks in this area."

Bihac correspondent Mirza Sadikovic reports that "the bestial shelling of the Bihac and Cazin areas continued overnight. Chetnik howitzers, tanks, Bofors, Zis, mortars [words indistinct] where everything is being systematically destroyed. Fierce shelling and combined artillery and infantry attacks directed at the defenders on Grabez and the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau continued late last night and this morning. Artillery provocations continued on the demarcation lines with the army of the so-called Kladusa autonomy, particularly in the region of (?Trst) in the Cazin Commune. The situation in the Velika Kladusa Commune is best illustrated by Fikret Abdic himself, who two days ago ordered new measures against all those who are not on his side. This is in effect an introduction to a fresh offensive on the free part of Bihac Commune."

UN: Muslims Raped, Murdered in Banja Luka

AU0403121394 Paris AFP in English 1208 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, March 4 (AFP)—Moslems are being raped and murdered in continued ethnic cleansing in the Serb city of Banja Luka in northern Bosnia, a UN spokesman said here Friday.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman Kris Janowski told reporters of several cases of rape and murder since January. He said that despite reports that some of the attacks were carried out by "uniformed" men, none of the cases had ever been followed up by the authorities.

"Everybody's wearing pretty much the same kind of uniform. We understand that they are either part of some sort of militia or Serb military or whoever," he said of the perpetrators.

He said the authorities told the UNHCR "all the time" that they had nothing to do with the attacks which were allegedly being done by criminals. "But none of these cases has ever been followed and no one has ever been punished so we assume that this is all done with the knowledge and at least the silent consent of the authorities. Otherwise they would do something to stop it."

Janowski said "at least five persons have been murdered since the beginning of January in Banja Luka" but he did not give details.

He added that there were "countless cases of people being beaten up and intimidated, the Moslem neighborhood raided by uniformed gangs... trying to give them the message to get out" and that this had "been going on for quite a while." He cited the case of 200 Moslems who had fled the village of Bronzani Majdan, not far from Banja Luka, and asked the UNHCR to get them out of the country. [passage omitted]

"We are trying to monitor the situation but it is very difficult," Janowski said.

Serbs Report Aggression by Muslim Forces

LD0303163994 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] Over the past 24 hours Muslim forces continued attacking Serb positions and villages, the most intensive attacks being launched in the northern part of the Srpska republic.

Last night Muslim forces based in a number of Bihac suburbs launched artillery attacks on Serb positions killing one Serb soldier and wounding four others in Barakovac [a village near Bihac], a SRNA [Serb news agency] correspondent has reported, quoting a communique issued by the command of the 2d Krajina Corps of the Srpska republic army.

Members of the 5th Corps of the Muslim Army loyal to Alija Izetbegovic based in Zalozje, Carkici, Cekrlije, and Vinica have continuously been attacking Serb fighters' positions. Muslim units have been launching the fiercest attacks against Serb positions in Barakovac above Bihac. Fighters of the 2d Krajina Corps have successfully repelled all attacks.

Due to their failures on the battlefield, the Muslim authorities of Bihac district tried to stage-manage another Markale [Sarajevo market place massacre in February] in Bihac for consumption by the foreign media. Muslim information media in Bihac said last night that a Serb artillery round killed 12 civilians. This news was denied today by the command of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] French battalion stationed in Caralici near Cazin, saying that the Serbs did not carry out any attacks at all yesterday.

In addition, Muslim authorities in Bihac yesterday banned all humanitarian convoys bound for the western part of the Srpska republic from passing through the Cazin area. As a result, humanitarian aid will in the future travel through the territory of the republic of Serb Krajina [in Croatia], a journey that is several hundred kilometers longer.

Army Captures Territory Near Gracanica

AU0403121894

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1100 GMT on 4 March carries in its regular 17-minute newscast two reports on the fighting in the republic.

An unidentified correspondent reports from the 3d Corps Press Center and says that "over the past few days, the ustasha provocations have not been intense enough to provoke our army's troops, which have been consistently observing the orders of the military command. Yesterday was marked by mainly small arms provocations by the enemy side. Sniper fire at our defense lines in the regions of Nevic Polje and Ciglane on the Vitez front, and at our positions around Busovaca from the direction of Pabjak, Kula, Radenovac, Komar, and Donje Polje constituted the most frequent provocations. In Gornji Vakuf, the ustashas fired several Tromblon grenades in addition to small arms provocations, but our soldiers did not respond."

He adds that "the chetniks from their artillery strongholds continue to shell civilian buildings sporadically. They fired several mortar shells at Zavidovici, and they fired a dozen artillery shells of various types at villages close to the defense lines. The chetniks also fired several shells at Bugojno from the direction of Donji Vakuf, which resulted in sizable material damage."

An unidentified correspondent from Gracanica reports that "in a counterattack carried out on this front, our defenders liberated two dominant peaks where the chetniks had killed dozens of innocent civilians in the course of the war. Overnight, the aggressor from the direction of Bosansko Suho Polje used 82-mm and 120-mm mortars to shell civilian targets in Klokotnica [words indistinct] at Stefan Polje. During the night, the chetniks brought in fresh forces and equipment to the Trebava [River] front. Over 60 truckloads of men arrived in the areas of Paleznica and (?Sember) Rijeka, while five tanks have been deployed facing our defense lines. This implies that the chetniks will today launch an even fiercer offensive in these areas."

Mladic, Rose Discuss Ways To Strengthen Peace

AU0303210694 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Report by Marica Lalovic from Sarajevo]

[Text] Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic, commander of the army of the Sr pska republic, held talks in Lukavica today with General Michael Rose, commander of UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Forces] for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, about strengthening the peace in Sarajevo. The two commanders also talked about further controlling the weapons in and around Sarajevo, particularly the Muslim weapons, as the Muslim side has still not fully complied with the agreement on putting its weapons under UNPROFOR's control. By the way, as Rasim Delic, commander of the so-called Muslim army, did not show up, the meeting of military commanders of the Serbian and Muslim armies that should have been held in Sarajevo today did not take place. Michael Rose tried to excuse Delic's failure to come to the meeting with his being busy establishing peace, as he put it, for his people in central Bosnia.

UN 'on Track' To Restore Sarajevo Peace

AU0403093094 Paris AFP in English 0922 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, March 4 (AFP)—UN officials remain confident they are on track to restore peace to Sarajevo despite isolated violations of a truce in the capital. But their optimism was dented Friday when UN Bosnia commander General Michael Rose expressed unhappiness about the failure of rival military commanders to attend a joint meeting the previous day.

"There is no way back," Viktor Andreyev, civilian affairs officer for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) told AFP Thursday.

UNPROFOR officers have said a ceasefire that began February 11 is holding despite violations that have included mortar fire within the 20-kilometre (12-mile) heavy weapons exclusion zone NATO has declared around Sarajevo. Small-arms and grenade attacks have increased along the confrontation line in the capital.

"We're going in the right direction but we have to move fast when these incidents occur to keep it from getting worse," UNPROFOR spokesman Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Aikman said. [passage omitted]

Sarajevo was calm overnight Thursday but this week has marked the most serious shooting in the Bosnian capital since the ceasefire began. The shooting is coming mainly from the Jewish cemetery in southern Sarajevo, where French troops are monitoring the ceasefire on the Bosnian side and Russian troops are on the Serb side. [passage omitted]

Andreyev said the fact that shelling of Sarajevo had stopped was the mark of success so far. "One cannot expect things to go straight and without bumps," he said of prospects for securing a lasting peace and restoring utilities and other services to the besieged city.

Andreyev said the process "must succeed. We must succeed."

Hungarian Ambassador, Izetbegovic View Relations

AU0303170594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Report by Nedzad Leko]

[Text] [Begin recording] [Leko] The Republic of Hungary is among the 46 countries with which Bosnia-Herzegovina has established diplomatic relations and one of the first countries to have done so. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Gabor (Bagy), upon presenting the credentials of President Arpad Goncz, emphasized that Hungary is also looking after a sizable number of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Izetbegovic, upon receiving the credentials, said that this action confirms Bosnia-Herzegovina's

international and legal legitimacy and at the same time represents support in the struggle against the aggression, for freedom and democracy. Then President Izetbegovic added:

[Izetbegovic] Our people know of the support that [words indistinct] offers in the struggle for the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina and they know the fact that a great number of our refugees are there [words indistinct]. The manner in which [word indistinct] the president of your state supports the anti-fascist struggle of the Bosnia-Herzegovina people [words indistinct] is priceless for the strengthening of democracy in Europe and in the entire world.

[Leko] After this and after presenting his credentials, Hungarian Ambassador Gabor (Bagy), in a statement for journalists, said:

[Bagy] This is an expression of Hungry's stance regarding the resolution of the crisis on this territory. This is a stance that rejects forceful changes of borders, ethnic cleansing, and change of ethnic [word indistinct] and does not recognize the consequences of this. Hungary hails the new element in the resolution of the crisis and the greater activity of the international community, the United States, and other international factors, as well as active participation in the resolution of the crisis in this area, and supports these initiatives.

In bilateral relations we have many possibilities for trade, however, [word indistinct] present war-restricted circumstances, but Hungary has a lasting interest in developing relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, not merely in bilateral relations, but also in relations of the multilateral integration of the central European territories, were Hungary ascribes an important role to Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording]

Tudjman Address on Croat-Muslim Agreement

LD0303215694 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Address to the nation by President Franjo Tudjman on the Washington agreement between Croats and Muslims in Zagreb on 3 March—live or recorded]

[Text] To Croatian people at home and abroad, to all citizens of Croatia: The day before yesterday, 1 March, a preliminary agreement was signed in Washington between representatives of the Croat and the Bosnian Muslim people regarding the organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina along federal lines—as a community of inherently sovereign people in the Federal Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina and on its entering a coalition with Croatia. Given its content and the circumstances in which it was created, this agreement is of far-reaching and also crucial and historical importance. The agreement was reached under the aegis of the United States and with the consent of leading European countries. For this reason, this agreement first of all means a radical change in their attitude to the settlement of the crisis on former Yugoslav soil.

The most important international factors—led by the United States—have finally come to the conclusion that one has to take resolute steps in order to end the three-year crisis, which began with the aggression of the Yugo-communist army and Serbia against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and end the war in Bosnia which has caused one of the biggest tragedies of our time and is threatening to spread the catastrophe of war worldwide.

These were and still are the reasons for which the state policy of democratic Croatia will stand by its orientation toward achieving and protecting vital national interests in accordance with international circumstances.

By adhering to principles and through our consistent policy in this respect, Croatia gradually gained favor with those who were not partial to its sovereignty and independent policy and finally obtained full guarantees from the most responsible international factors for the security of its state and the future of the Croatian people.

Croatia increasingly won the trust of the world democratic public and responsible statesmen starting with a recommendation that the Croatian people should take part in a referendum for the retention of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the urgent establishment of diplomatic relations with the government in Sarajevo, and the urging and accepting of proposals for the settlement of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina along cantonal, provincial and finally confederal lines in the form of a union of republics. This was rejected both by the Serb and the Muslim sides until the agreement was signed in Washington.

The implementation of the agreement signed in Washington by Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mate Granic, Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina Haris Silajdzic, and Kresimir Zubak, president of the presidential council of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, is in the interest of the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim nations, as well as the international community.

An end to the war between the Muslim and Croat nations in Bosnia is of paramount importance for us. That conflict has caused great loss in human life and material destruction to the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and brings the threat of international sanctions upon Croatia because of the assistance lent to them [Bosnian Croats], first in the defense against the Serb aggression, and then in their struggle against the threat of the Muslim extremist forces.

The agreement between the Croatian and Muslim sides also sets conditions for reaching an agreement with the Serb side and for defining borders acceptable to all three nations within Bosnia- Herzegovina. However, international factors must persist in seeking a sensible overall solution in order to create preconditions for normal neighborly relations between the new Croatian-Bosnian confederal union on the one side and Serbia, that is, Yugoslavia on the other side; all the more so because this [agreement] determines a new long-term fault-line between international powers which have for centuries been opposing and fighting each other in this critical region of different civilizations.

All national and political entities which are in any way participating in solving the extremely complex Bosnian problem should—in the interests of European and global peace—do everything they can in order to reach an accord between the three warring nations and their mother-countries, but also with the main world factors—the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and the Russian Federation, in order to create preconditions for the stability of a new international order in this part of Europe, precisely because its birth has caused unimaginable war atrocities and threats of conflict between civilizations.

The implementation of the Washington agreement will secure the survival and future of the Croat people not only within the borders of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, established in the war of defense, but throughout the territory of Bosnia, which will not be allocated to the separate Serb Republic. Furthermore, the agreement guarantees Croats full national sovereignty in the Croat cantons—probably to be called grand-counties [velezupe] in Croatian—which will form a Croat council as a separate representative body of the Croat community, as well as full parity and complete equality in overall state affairs of the Federal Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

All of this will have additional guarantees in the recognition of dual citizenship, i.e., Croatian citizenship too, for every member of the Croatian people from Bosnia as well as in the confederal union between Croatia and the

Federal Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This confederal union will be based on shared interests in developing comprehensive relations in all spheres, particularly in international and defense policies, the economy, science, and culture.

The establishment of a joint command of defense forces is envisaged, as well as a customs and monetary union within the framework of a common market. A permanent confederal council [konfederalno vijece] will be formed with a view to coordinating joint policy and activity.

The materialization of the envisaged federation between the Croatian and the Bosnian Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its confederation with Croatia implies creating needed political, constitutional, and legal foundations.

The Croats ought to understand that such a solution is historically necessary and purposeful for the survival of Croatiandom in Bosnia and the protection of the Croatian state's strategic interests. The alliance with the Croats secures the survival of the Bosnian Muslims in these lands, as well as links with western civilization and democratic countries.

The effective implementation of the agreement on both unions [federation and confederation], something that is in the vital interest of both peoples as well as of the democratic Western world, can only be opposed by advocates of narrow-minded nationalism and extremist-fundamentalist views.

Unlike such exceptions, the vast majority of Croats and Bosnians—not just those Muslims who have hitherto declared themselves as Croats—will wholeheartedly start building the shared future.

Referring to all the above, I find it necessary to emphasize that the Croatian-Bosnian-Muslim union is not aimed against the Serbs. Nor is it being created in order to continue the war. It is being created to secure peace without delay.

Croatia will remain committed to peaceful, political solutions to all contested issues, including the normalization of Serbian- Croatian relations on the basis of mutual recognition, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In order to achieve this, Serbia and Yugoslavia ought to stop supporting the further occupation of Croatian territories by arming [Krajina], introducing a shared currency, and suchlike.

It is high time for Krajina's Serbs to draw their conclusions about the futility of continuing their resistance to being integrated into Croatia's constitutional and legal order, because their further out-maneuverings of UN Security Council resolutions will no longer be tolerated either from the point of view of Croatian interests or from the point of view of international interests.

Croatia guarantees to them all human, civil and ethnic rights, but it cannot tolerate any delay in the return of its refugees, the reintegration of its state territory, and the establishment of normal conditions for its further economic and cultural development.

Dear Croats at home and abroad, the citizens of Croatia, by signing the agreement in Washington, we took a big step along the difficult path to secure the future of the Croatian nation, and the stability and prosperity of the Croatian state. On our part, we will do everything to complete the agreement as soon as possible in the constitutional and legal sense, and to implement it.

During the talks which our foreign minister and I personally held with representatives of many foreign countries—and on the day the agreement was signed even with U.S. President Clinton—we received assurances from the most senior statesmen and world factors that Croatia would be given support in solving all its vital and burning problems. Everyone promised us diverse and resolute assistance in the process of integrating the areas under the protection of the peace forces into the overall life in Croatia. We were promised assistance for reconstruction. World and all international financial institutions will be free to offer us loans and to finance various economic investment programs, which have so far been denied to us. The door to European integration will be opened to us, as well as admission into NATO's Partnership for Peace protection system.

All this confirms that major international factors today consider Croatia an important, even one of the crucial, elements for establishing peace and international order in this part of Europe. All this leads us to believe that we have come close to the ending of the war and the beginning of a new period in the building of the sovereign democratic state of Croatia.

The new conditions will allow us to dedicate all our potential to the economic recovery and cultural development of our homeland. The preliminary Washington agreement has therefore created preconditions for a political solution to the crisis, for an end to the destruction of war, killing and persecution of people, and for their return to normal life. Briefly, it heralds peace.

All this confirms the correctness and usefulness of our consistent state policy, the paramount goal of which has always been to secure the freedom of the Croatian people and the sovereignty of Croatia with as few victims as possible. We have strengthened the democratic system and international standing of the Croatian state guided by our own judgment, maturity and support of the vast majority of the Croatian people and all citizens of Croatia. We can be proud of the results we have achieved and new possibilities which have opened up for us, but we should also be aware of the responsibilities and the seriousness of the tasks ahead of us in new, more favorable international conditions.

Granic Interview on Muslim-Croat Agreement

LD0403111294 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2205 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Studio interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Dubravko Merlic; from the "Slikom na Sliku" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Merlic] Good evening, esteemed viewers, and welcome to this evening's Slikom na Sliku program. As we announced earlier, our guest this evening is Mate Granic, vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. Good evening, and welcome back from your successful diplomatic tour.

[Granic] Good evening.

[Merlic] [passage omitted] Mr. Granic, I am under the impression that the vast majority of reactions to the preliminary agreement signed in Washington are extremely favorable, except for a few unfavorable or restrained reactions from Serbia. What is the true situation on the ground, and do you have any information from Herceg-Bosna? I hear that politicians and people in Herceg-Bosna are finding it difficult to accept this agreement. It seems that the wounds sustained in this serious Muslim-Croat conflict have not yet healed.

[Granic] There are fears, and one should be understanding and make explanations patiently. I think this is our reality. I believe that people will accept the agreement, but we must be patient in explaining all the advantages the Croatian people will gain by this agreement in both Herceg-Bosna and in Croatia.

[Merlic] What was particularly well stressed in President Tudjman's speech, I think, was that this proposal—this agreement—would not be accepted only by narrow-minded nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists. How realistic is this, given the situation on the ground?

[Granic] The president gave his assessment of the agreement today. You said that 60 countries requested permission to broadcast his speech immediately. It is quite certain that many other countries will make such a request. This has been a number one topic in the world and on all TV stations over the past three days. I believe there will be a lack of understanding initially. I believe there will be fear, but I also believe that once it is all over, and when not just a preliminary but also a final agreement are signed, the people will accept it.

[Merlic] In the past few days politicians from Herceg-Bosna expressed their views and sharp criticism, saying that they could not accept an agreement which contains no guarantees of territories, of the territorial integrity of this Croatian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are these fears justified?

[Granic] We have received guarantees at different levels with this agreement. On the one side, from the geopolitical, geostrategic, and economic point of view, Croatia has every interest in a confederation based on a modern union: a customs, monetary, and economic union and a defense alliance, with a shared command, confederal council. On the other—as far as Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are concerned—all Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be included in this agreement. [passage omitted]

[Merlic] Talking about the cantons—or as they will be called in Croatian, grand counties [velezupa]...

[Granic, interrupting] President Tudjman said that today, and we will probably propose that name....

[Merlic, interrupting] You said that the cantons will be sovereign. What duties will lie with the cantons? Will the cantons have armies and police?

[Granic] You see, it says here that the cantons will have jurisdiction over police, education, culture, housing issues....

[Merlic, interrupting] Talking about the police, will they have different uniforms in different cantons, or will they be the same?

[Granic] The uniforms will be the same, but the insignia will differ from canton to canton. That has been agreed upon. Therefore, certain tasks will be carried out at the level of the federation, there will be joint tasks, and some tasks will be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the cantons. The basic aim was to set up a federation that can function on the one hand, and on the other hand, to secure a high level of decentralization in the form of cantons which are inherently sovereign, and which are federal units.

[Merlic] The army will be at the level of the federation.

[Granic] There is a final solution and a solution for the interim period. Nothing will change in the interim period; things will only be coordinated. The final solution envisages the army to be at the level of the federation. I will read it out: joint command, joint military system within the confederation and the protection of borders. That will be at the level of the federation, at the level of the cantons. [sentence as heard]

[Merlic] It could be irresponsible to mention this now, but a prominent leader of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA - Stranka demokratske akcije] of Croatia spoke on the TV Parliament program last week about the navy in Neum. Is that irresponsible, or is he well informed?

[Granic] I think that is irresponsible. As I said, we will have coordination at the level of the confederation [as heard]. Therefore, this has never been mentioned. We do want coordination because we have the same strategic interests in having a defense alliance and coordination at the level of the confederation. But of course such ideas were not discussed.

[Merlic] Let us go back to the Croat-Bosniak federation briefly. What seems to me the greatest problem that

needs to be dealt with in the future is the territorial division. It is not mentioned anywhere how many and which cantons there will be and which territory they will cover.

[Granic] There are proposals, but there have been no official talks on that issue yet.

[Merlic] Do we know how many cantons there will be?

[Granic] It is certain that Hercegovina will be a separate canton, as well as western Bosnia and Posavina. There are various possibilities for central Bosnia.

[Merlic] Will central Bosnia perhaps be a mixed canton?

[Granic] There have been proposals to make central Bosnia one big mixed canton with two sub-cantons, one of which would be Croat and one Bosniak, or perhaps to have two separate cantons. No agreement has been reached on that. The exact number of cantons will be discussed over the next 10 days. No agreement has been reached so far. [passage omitted reiterates Serbs should give up 20 percent of their territory through negotiations; summary of Russia's involvement in solving the Bosnian crisis over the past 10 days] I was invited to go to Moscow today, but that was not possible because of my visit to Paris. I will go to Moscow next week.

[Merlic] There are several options for the Bosnian Serbs. They can say no, they can yield territory, or they can join in and remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina in one way or another. What seems the most likely possibility to you?

[Granic] As it has been said, they will be invited to join in under the same conditions.

[Merlic] On the federal principle?

[Granic] Yes, that is right. They will be invited to join in on the federal principle—after the principles are agreed upon, of course. That is the first option. The second option is for them to remain in some kind of relationship with the federation, as the European Union has suggested—the (?division between) the federation and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is one of the possibilities. In any case, they would not be allowed to leave now. [passage omitted]

[Merlic] If the Bosnian Serbs decide to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina, either on this federal principle, or on some kind of confederal principle, does that mean that Croatia would still form a confederation with that kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Granic] Croatia has political, strategic, and economic interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is perfectly clear today that this is also the West's strategic interest. This has never been defined more clearly than now. I believe that Croatia has firmly decided to take that step—both by signing and by today's statement by President Tudjman, which has been well received throughout the world. I can say that in the United States the news about the signing [the agreement on confederation] met with almost unanimous approval—among diplomats, in the Security Council, and in the United Nations. We will continue along this path. It will not be easy. As you can see, there are a lot of obstacles that need to be overcome successfully, and this is why we said that this was the first—important and historic—but only the first step.

[Merlic] To end this interview, I have a question about the guarantees and promises that the United States and the international community have made to Croatia. Primarily, the most interesting one is a certain guarantee that the occupied areas of Croatia will be returned under Croatia's sovereignty. There is also financial assistance and the cooperation in military issues, namely, membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace. Have any of these guarantees been put down on paper?

[Granic] The guarantees have not been put down on paper, but they are being discussed. In the talks I have had with Vice President Gore, General Shalikashvili, Defense Secretary Perry, and State Secretary Christopher, we discussed all this in more detail than you mentioned here. This is not all. Access to financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, will be opened up to us. The public knows that some loans have been blocked for political reasons. That is one group of offers. The other one is the European Union. Talks on this are under way; very intensive talks. [passage omitted: EU to discuss Bosnia on Monday]

[Granic] What is the most interesting for us, of course, is the reintegration of the UN protected areas into Croatia's state and legal system. I discussed this with the UN secretary general. We will put our proposal in writing by mid-March, and demand guarantees and support from the United States and EU, from all important international factors. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Not To Renew UNPROFOR Mandate

LD0303175494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman today received Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] coordinator for former Yugoslavia, and his associates, the president's office announced.

Recalling that the UNPROFOR mandate [in Croatia] was expiring at the end of this month, Tudjman said Croatia would not agree to renew the mandate under present conditions. He emphasized that UNPROFOR supervision in the protected areas was insufficient, the best proof of which was the latest incident involving the downing of Serb aircraft which took off from protected areas in the Republic of Croatia. Special Envoy Akashi said the UN secretary general would inform the Security Council about the implementation of UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia by the end of the month.

Speaking about the Croat-Muslim Washington agreement, President Tudjman said the entire geopolitical situation has changed as a result of this and international and Croatian efforts would now be directed towards the solving of the problem of the reintegration of protected areas into the constitutional and legal system of the country.

In conclusion, President Tudjman stressed that the problem no longer lies in the territorial settlement between the three nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that a division between East and West has now surfaced, whose interests have always clashed in this area, the president's office has announced.

Martic Denies Downed Aircraft Came From RSK

LD0403123694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0954 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Podgorica, 4 Mar (TANJUG)—Milan Martic, president of the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), denied in today's POBJEDA that the downed planes had taken off from RSK territory.

"It is out of the question that our planes from Udbine were flying over the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Srpska republic. Our own airspace is sufficient for us, and we have no need for any Air Force activities over those areas."

"We do not want to interfere in the fighting between our brothers from the Srpska republic and the Muslims, knowing that our brothers have enough strength and knowledge to resist the Muslims, who, particularly in recent days, have abused all cease-fires for new armed actions against the Serbs," Martic said.

He said that the misinformation about the RSK military activities over the former Bosnia-Herzegovina had originated from BORBA.

Article on Possible Union of Leftist Parties

AU0403111694 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Feb 94 p 13

[Article by Branko Podgornik: "Will the Left Soon Recover?"]

[Text] The first obvious sign of recovery of the Croatian left has recently emerged. Four years after the beginning of the collapse of the former Communist Party, something new is trying to grow out of its ruins. Ivica Racan's Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP), created from a reformist faction in the former regime party, has united with Antun Vujic's Social Democratic Party (SDH), which was established in 1989 in opposition to the former regime.

The long-announced gathering of leftist social democrats is nevertheless starting to get under way, and some 10 days ago, leaders of both parties publicly confirmed that. They present themselves as two factions on the left of center Croatian political scene: social democrats from the former ruling party and social democrats from the opposition, and they advocate an independent and democratic Croatia.

Without the Third Side

However, with the appearance of a third movement on the left, which primarily includes Branko Horvat's Social Democratic Union (SDU), they will not and cannot unite. They think the third is continuing the work of conservative forces from the former regime, regarding the idea of a form of Yugoslav community, which see the creation of the Croatian state as a necessary evil. The Socialist Party of Croatia (SSH), headed by Silvije Degen, is a fourth leftist party, but Croatian social democrats have noticed that the Socialists wander between them and the SDU, and that they do not want to take sides.

It is impossible to unite all the leftist parties because, even since 1990, the deepest polarization in Croatia is situated exactly to the left of the political center. Those who advocate Croatia are on one side of this front line and those who advocate Yugoslavia or invoke its spirits are on the other.

Observers say that the attempt to unite everything that exists left of center would look like an attempt to glue together the former Croatian League of Communists: As though it were being attempted to shut a cat and a dog in the same cage and put the well- known curse on the left: May you have to deal with yourself! People say that that would continue to prevent the left from developing into a force that could mean something on the Croatian political scene.

But many still insist on uniting the ununitable. Some members of the SDP claim that some do it naively wishing for the left to get stronger, but the road to hell is often paved with the best of intentions. Some think that uniting all the leftist parties is being encouraged by some circles in the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and outside it—those who want to weaken the left fearing it could get back to power in Croatia as well, as has already happened in many Eastern European countries. If the advocates of compromised ideas were to belong to one party, people say that the ruling party would find it easier to deal with the left, while the existing Racan's and especially Vujic's social democrats are a bit harder to control now.

Identity Crisis

Furthermore, people say that insisting on merging all the leftist parties is beneficial for some circles in the SDU and the SSH, as that part of the left is undergoing an identity crisis. A new identity can easily be found if they come closer to the social democrats, who acquire and want to continue to acquire an identity and legitimacy first of all with the Croatian nation. At former state and local elections, the SDP got the biggest share of the 9 percent of votes for the left.

Ivica Racan is claiming these days that "the attempt to unite everything leftist in one party would marginalize the left and then also marginalize and eliminate the SDP. I will not agree to that, and I believe that I am supported by most people in the party."

Some observers explain why it would be good for, for example "the far left" headed by Branko Horvat, which Stipe Suvar likes as well, to suppress the SDP, and especially to suppress Ivica Racan. In 1990, when he was a member of the SDP, Horvat criticized Racan for intending to give the SDP the name of social democrats but a couple of years later he changed his mind and started advocating social democratic concepts himself. "Far left" circles reproached Racan for having a poor strategy, with being "the grave-digger of the party," with "betraying the Serbs" after the first democratic elections, and the like.

Indeed, after getting almost 30 percent of the votes at the elections in 1990, the SDP got only some 5 percent at the elections in 1992. It became evident that the party had reached an all time low, but it survived, recovered, and is now preparing to move slowly upward. These days one often hears the old anti- communists complimenting former communist Ivica Racin on his way of leading the party; they appreciate his political experience, and sometimes refer to the SDP as "polite civic party, which has contributed to democracy and inter-Croatian reconciliation."

An observer has remarked that Racan's adversaries from the left could now be forced to admit that Racan was right in some things and that he "has not become history like some of his critics who were tied up by history."

Racan or Tripalo

The same observer continues that it is difficult to admit that owing to personal vanity, and some are quietly trying to push Racan away from the leading position in the SDP, including members of his own party. Lately, they have welcomed references to Mika Tripalo as a possible president of the united left, for that would make it easier to do away with Racan and the SDP. Still, our source claims that Racan and Tripalo are not in conflict, they recently had a long talk behind closed doors and cleared up matters, and they are also publicly praising each other.

Indeed, in the last couple of months, Racan himself has considered withdrawing from the leading position into the party shadows. However, VJESNIK's source continues, "now Racan, too, is displaying a kind of vanity. He does not want to be written off but wants to prove that he can not only preserve the party but also stimulate its growth, and that has lately become evident. In that, he is supported by most members of the SDP; he is even being pushed by them."

All in all, after the successful party reform, which Racan carried out by relying on the so-called youth line, the SDP is now trying to make a step forward on the Croatian political scene. With a refreshed and rejuvenated leadership, the SDP wants to be the center of the Croatian democratic left, which will spread toward the center. As a sign of that, members of the party claim, they decided to unite with the SDH, whose members did not hide their political inclinations toward the reformists in the SDP. Antun Vujic claims he finds it easier to talk to members of earlier factions of the SDP than with Racan himself.

Circles close to the SDP and the SDH claim it is soon to be expected that many prominent men will publicly support the unification of social democrats in order to help them develop politically. Observers say that Racan is counting on young people in his party in particular to carry forward social democratic ideas, and that there are such people in the SDH as well, for the unburdened generation can suppress conflicts in the party that mostly originated in the past and that are directed toward the past instead of the present.

A young member of the SDP, now in the party leadership, says it was most difficult for him in the election campaign of 1990. At that time, new Croatian parties were setting up their stalls on Jelacic Square and selling party materials and symbols. "I was standing behind the SDP stand, and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] stands were to the left and to the right of me and people were fighting to get to them while no one came to me except for old ladies and stool pigeons. One of them shouted: 'And where is your famous equipment—the hammer and sickle?' I replied sadly they had been stolen by some people from the HDZ. When the war begin, I volunteered. Of course, it was difficult for me at the front lines as well, but easier than on Jelacic Square in 1990."

Gligorov Discusses Relations With Greece

NC0303175594 Athens ELEVTHEROS TIPOS in Greek 2 Mar 94 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Kiro Gligorov, president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM, by Yeoryios Kharvalias at the presidential villa in Skopje on 1 March 1994]

[Excerpts] [Kharvalias] Mr. President, what did you discuss with the German alternate foreign minister [title as published]?

[Gligorov] We discussed the more general problems of the Balkans and above all our confrontation with Greece! The problems caused us by the Greek trade blockade. I must note with satisfaction that the German Government was absolutely categorical about the illegal nature of these measures and the dangers they pose for stability in the region. At this point, I would like to thank German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel for the relevant remarks that he recently made in Athens...

[Kharvalias] Have you gotten any specific commitments of political or economic support from the German side?

[Gligorov] First of all, we noted our mutual desire to strengthen bilateral relations, particularly economic and trade relations, as well as technical aid. However, we did not discuss any specific plan for economic support by Bonn. We pointed out once again the stated desire by the German side to help the "Republic of Macedonia." [passage omitted]

[Kharvalias] However, it appeared last spring that Greece and Skopje, with the exception of the name, had reached a significant rapprochement—a compromise on the emblems, the flag, and so forth. What has happened since then?

[Gligorov] After the adoption of the relevant Security Council resolution, which was a particularly positive development, there were exceptionally useful discussions at the United Nations under the auspices of Cyrus Vance and David Owen. I believe that substantive progress was made at those talks, there was a substantive rapprochement between the two sides.

But after that, the elections were held in Greece, the negotiations stopped and later, instead of resuming them as would be natural, the new Greek Government announced their suspension! Moreover, it set the three well-known conditions!

I believe this is not a creative approach for two neighboring countries such as Greece and "Macedonia," which are not facing very serious problems. Instead of understanding, we have a unilateral embargo without a Security Council decision having been made in advance as was the case with Serbia.

I must stress that we have not resorted to any countermeasure and so far people and goods from Greece enter our territory without any restrictions.

[Kharvalias] But Greece is the only country that guarantees your territorial integrity. What are you doing as a goodwill gesture?

[Gligorov] But we have made goodwill gestures! We have amended our Constitution with a clause that says that we do not have territorial claims against any of our neighbors and, moreover, we added the provision that we will never interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring countries.

In addition, even in my recent letter to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou I stated that we are prepared to sign a treaty with Greece on the inviolability of borders which, if necessary, could be guaranteed by the European Union and/or the United Nations!

I remind you that during the former embargo by the Konstandinos Mitsotakis administration we did not resort to countermeasures. We do not have the slightest intention to take reprisals against neighboring Greece. We merely view the whole situation with regret because we seek friendly relations with Greece and the Greek people. [passage omitted]

[Kharvalias] By any chance did Alternate German Foreign Minister Helmut Schaefer urge you to make another goodwill gesture toward the Greek side?

[Gligorov] We were not given such advice or recommendation. I believe that most of the European Union ministers realize that we have already made many concessions. The dialogue will have to begin at some time.

[Kharvalias] When was your latest contact with a Greek politician?

[Gligorov] I am very sorry because I have never had any contacts with Greek politicians, although at the first moment of the crisis I sent a letter to Athens for a meeting with then Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis. I have never received any answer. [passage omitted]

Federal

Jovanovic on Muslim-Croat Federation Agreement

AU0303191094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1558 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Interview with FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Dragan Colovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Colovic] Mr. Jovanovic, we are talking about Croatian-Muslim agreement reached in Washington between the Croats and Muslims about a joint federation and a confederation with Croatia. This agreement, which was reached under the auspices of the United States, has been interpreted differently. Moreover, there are many reserves about its feasibility considering the fierce Muslim-Croatian clashes that have been underway for several months already. However, some dilemnas still remain and are still appearing. Where, in fact, lies the final [words indistinct] when Serbs are completely ignored in all this?

[Jovanovic] First, this is a bilateral agreement, and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a (?trilateral) civil war. This is a bilateral agreement that was reached with the active help of a foreign power, which also sets certain limitations. Finally, this is an agreement that, in the way it works, is virtually suspending, if not disregarding, the tripartite agreement on the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was reached at the Geneva conference. These are three facts that represent [word indistinct] objective limitations on the agreement and cast a certain light on the agreement as an independent action that has been developing while disregarding, and often contrary to, what has so far been done within the Geneva conference and in the ancillary efforts, be they within the European Community, by Russia, or by some other countries.

However, if this bilateral agreement is aimed at a humane goal, that is, to extinguish the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the moment, the only form of real civil war in Bosnia is the war waged between the Muslims and Croats, and if on the basis of that result it wants to regulate relations between the Muslims and the Croats in a permanent way, not touching on the interests and rights of the third, Serb, side, then there will be nothing to object to in such an agreement. However, if it has some other aims, if it not only left the third side unconsulted, but even faced it with an impossible choice between accepting and rejecting the agreement—albeit in case it fails to accept it, it would have to be punished for its alleged uncooperativeness—then this agreement could be qualified as the agreement of two sides against the third, with the assistance of a major power. I would not like to forecast that this may come true, but if it nevertheless happens, it will be a big step backward in comparison with the present situation and the efforts made within Geneva conference for a tripartite, just, and permanent end to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In this agreement, we have several elements that warn that this offer will be of very little attraction to the Bosnian Serbs. The setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being returned to the canton concept, a concept of several cantons to boot. Central authorities are essentially strengthened compared to what was envisaged in the constitutional arrangement in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a union of three republics. And finally, what is most important, the question of territorial borders has not been mentioned at all, and this setting of borders should be done, above all, in close cooperation with the Serbian side. The fact that this most-important question, without which there is no further work, [words indistinct] in this (?bilateral) agreement, is the greatest drawback of this agreement as it points to its basic weak point, that is, that it is an agreement of two sides and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a war of three sides. And the third side, which was probably the most significant in this situation, was not included in the process of agreeing and decision making, so that it remains completely unclear as to what further attitude the authors of the agreement and the people interested in its implementation are going to have toward the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Colovic] Mr. Jovanovic, how could all that reflect on the current state of Serbian-Croatian relations? What I have in mind is what has been reached in Geneva in the agreement on the beginning of normalization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb?

[Jovanovic] The decision of the two sides, Serb and Croatian, to make the first step in the process of normalization represents the result of awareness that without settling Serbo-Croatian relations on the whole, there can be no mention of any permanent settlement of the situation and stability in the Balkans. This awareness is not only this on the Croatian and Serbian sides, but also on the side of all other factors who are involved in solving the Yugoslav crisis. Therefore, logically, this Washington agreement should not suspend the agreement between the governments of the FRY and the Republic of Croatia on opening offices on both sides, nor should its provisions, and particularly its unexpressed aims, confront the aims that the opened process of normalization of relations between FRY and Croatia wants to reach.

However, many unclear points in the Washington agreement, above all the unclear point on the question of the further treatment of the Serbian side in Bosnia and also the ambiguity regarding the attraction [privlacnost] that made Croatia accept something it has always categorically rejected so far, commands caution as well as an increased carefulness. For any attempt to put this agreement into practice or to interpret it as an agreement against overall Serbian interests may not only aggravate the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also call into question the very process of normalization between the FRY and the Republic of Croatia.

[Colovic] Some people fear that the former Bosnia-Herzegovina could soon become—if it is not exactly that

already—an arena of competition between the United States and Russia for the division of spheres of interest, not only in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, but, also, starting from the war in Bosnia, the competition would spread to the entire Balkans. How would you comment on that?

[Jovanovic] Well, it cannot be good if the crisis in Bosnia would last longer or if it was complicated further. It cannot be good for the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the interests of the neighboring states, and certainly not for the peace and stability in the region as a whole. Everybody who thinks responsibly about politics is doing everything with a view to ending this war as soon as possible and finding a complete, just, and permanent solution.

However, there are a lot of foreign interests that have, after all, brought about the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and pushed its people into the civil war, that have still not been satisfied, and that can also expand and be realized only with the continuation of the crisis. A quick end to the crisis does not suit many of these interests, and particularly not an end that would cap the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina and accelerate the solution of other aspects of the overall Yugoslav crisis.

What is alarming, even after this Washington agreement, even though there is plenty of talk about the end of war, peace, and political cooperation between some entities, is that we are still not close to this goal and that, perhaps, we should fear that we will not get all that close to it if the suspicions that this agreement means the reanimation of a Muslim-Croatian axis against the Serbs on the territories of the former Yugoslavia and against the FRY prove to be true.

[Colovic] Mr. Jovanovic, finally, can you say a few words about the future of the international conference on former Bosnia-Herzegovina and former Yugoslavia? Can the latest development of events threaten it? Is its mandate changing? I am referring primarily to the new initiatives. There has been talk about the summit of the five, which, as it is alleged, would also be open to others?

[Jovanovic] The peace process has so far evolved within the framework of the mandate and support of the UN, the European Union, and other relevant international factors, primarily the Bosnia-Herzegovina factors, understandably. The Washington initiative and its fruit, however, are a result of an entirely separate treatment of the important segments of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, independent of the framework of this peace process and even contrary to the hitherto joint stance and of the outcome that was particularly pronounced in the constitutional document about the regulation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina union. In this sense, and bearing this in mind, it is difficult to reconcile all these contradictions and see a future for the work of the Geneva conference on the basis of the Washington document. One thing should have been clarified beforehand, namely, either to establish the end of the so-called Owen-Stoltenberg plan or to announce the birth of a new plan, a new method, and a new approach that is expressed in the Washington document.

On the other hand, there is the Russian initiative, which departs from the responsibility of the five biggest states and does not negate and oppose the results of the Geneva process, but, on the contrary, wishes to accelerate the completion of the construction of peace on the basis of these results. However, the United States' reserve toward the Russian initiative has now materialized and it is now evident why the United States failed to support this initiative—because it was preparing to launch its own initiative without the participation of others, and, in our case, without consulting the Serbian side.

[Colovic] Mr. Jovanovic, in the name of the listeners of the Argument Vise [Argument More] program, thank you very much.

[Jovanovic] Thank you, too.

Government on Need To Improve U.S. Relations

LD0403155794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1342 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 4 Mar (TANJUG)—The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] at its session today concluded that Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic's visit to New York was successful and useful, the Federal Ministry of Information has announced. A statement from the session says:

The federal government at its session today examined and endorsed a report on the working visit by Yugoslav Prime Minister Kontic to New York between 15 and 19 February this year.

It was concluded that the visit was successful and useful and that it took place at a critical time of expiry of NATO ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, which was reflected in the topics of his meetings and talks. [passage omitted]

The federal government tasked the relevant departments with drawing up a platform regarding possibilities of developing Yugoslav-U.S. cooperation under the sanctions and after the lifting or the alleviation of the sanctions, taking into consideration concrete initiatives that were put forward by the American side in the course of Prime Minister Kontic's visit to New York.

The federal government today examined and endorsed a report on Yugoslav-U.S. relations under the conditions of crisis on the territory of former SFRY and the U.S. policy toward the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this regard, the importance of normalization of bilateral relations with the United States was emphasized, which was assessed as an important precondition for the just resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, the lifting of the UN Security Council sanctions and reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the international community.

A report on issues relating to cooperation with the Hague-based International War Crimes Tribunal, which is to try war crime- perpetrators from the former SFRY, and with a UN expert commission that was founded to investigate war crimes, was endorsed. In this connection the federal government concluded that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had a firm standpoint as regards prosecuting and punishing all persons who have committed crimes and have violated international humanitarian law. All such crimes are also punishable by the laws of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and therefore our judicial bodies are duty-bound to examine all relevant documents charging citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and persons staying on its territory, and if found guilty prosecute and punish them. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also accepts cooperation with all UN bodies, on this equal basis, not on the discriminatory basis on which the tribunal was founded, it was concluded at the session.

A platform for official visits by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic to Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Benin, and Gabon by the end of the month has been adopted. Guidelines have also been adopted for the participation of a Yugoslav delegation at a festival devoted to Nikola Tesla, which is to be held in Timisoara, Romania on 11 and 12 March.

The federal government set 20 March as the new deadline for the completion of final financial reports for last year.

Asim Telacevic has been relieved of his duties as federal deputy prime minister, because he is taking up a new post. Prime Minister Kontic appointed Uros Klikovac, hitherto the chairman of the committee for justice and federal administration of the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Republics, as the new federal deputy prime minister.

Vasilije Medenica, hitherto an official in the Federal Ministry of Transport and Communications, has been appointed acting federal flights inspector.

Tuzla Deemed More Dangerous Than Sarajevo

AU0403122294 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Feb 94 p 12

[Commentary by Ljubodrag Stojadinovic: "Tuzla More Dangerous Than Sarajevo"]

[Text] "Good night, Sarajevo, good morning, Tuzla." This is the title of a large article published in a newspaper of a Western country that is known for its efforts to end the war in Bosnia with "legitimate violence." This title is reminiscent of the Sarajevo Olympics slogan ("It was nice in Sarajevo, see you in Calgary!"). The message of this headline is a symbolic transposition of a successful model since everybody is convinced now that the Sarajevo model is the achievement of his life. All the participants in the Sarajevo action think that they scored diplomatic and other victories, which is a very sincere opinion.

The atmosphere created by the feelings of victory is to a certain extent a logical consequence of the high tension caused by the threat of a general war, which would have been a defeat for most of the participants and observers of the Sarajevo tragedy. All this contributed to the unfolding of events in a way that was inconceivable only 10 days ago. The winners are the Serbs, the Muslims, NATO, Russia, the tortured inhabitants of Sarajevo, the prophets who predicted the end of modern coalition monsters, and the cautious. The euphoria was expressed in different ways. The most influential were the most successful in convincing world audiences that the solution to the Sarajevo drama was a historic victory of the suspicious institution of ultimatum. After the euphoria had died down, it was seen that the story about "the Sarajevo model" was a complicated matter, and that this model is applicable only if the stones are put very carefully together, and this only once. The transfer of experiences is possible, but the transfer of the whole operation is, however, impossible. It must be realized that there is no universality in a recipe that may have been successful in one case.

It does not seem that the West is quite convinced that everything functioned according to the law of cruel war blackmail. In spite of this, the Alliance wants to try out its concept—which consists of threatening force and of creating good reasons to avoid its use in the end—on other Bosnian towns. The phenomenon of revenge against one warring faction dominated in Sarajevo, but the aim in Tuzla is quite different, although it might also include revenge. It is claimed that Tuzla airport is the key to the control of events in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but this may be only partially true. Closer to the truth might be the formula that there is a combination of direct interests and exertion of pressure through escalation, a combination in which every move follows from the previous one. Apart from the ultimatum (which is in a certain sense already set), in the case of Tuzla there is also the element of real provocation directed toward Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This has not been confirmed in public (yet), but nor has it been denied.

Tuzla airport is more important closed than open. If it is open, there is no great and dangerous theatrical performance around it—which must have the dimensions of a exciting war story in order to be of interest to the audiences and to result in expected reactions. If the Serbs do not yield to the blackmail, the airport will be opened by force. Many analysts think that such a move (legitimate violence) would have considerably more serious consequences than the hypothetical chase after Serbian guns around Sarajevo. The deadline set by NATO for the opening of Tuzla airport is 7 March. This is proof that there is a difference in the procedure between Sarajevo and Tuzla. In case of Sarajevo Butrus-Ghali asked NATO to prepare a bombing action. In case of Tuzla,

however, NATO asked Butrus-Ghali to act and took on the privilege for itself to support the action from the air. Basically, NATO dictated the rules of the game in both cases, though without having two basic pieces of information. First of all, whether its dictate was at all accepted, and second, how it would behave if its offer to support the action from the air was flatly refused. The Sarajevo action was explained with a series of humanitarian reasons and with the destiny of approximately 200,000 people, while the "Tuzla operation" on the other hand is explained with the necessity of having an airport, without mentioning that there are people in Tuzla, too—just as in Sarajevo. In this case predominantly Serbs.

Careful observers of the events in Bosnia are afraid of the future, of the announced spring offensives and of the restoration of the unnatural love between the Croats and the Muslims. The announced NATO violence against the Serbs in eastern Bosnia, supplies of weapons to the Muslims, and the increased presence of the West on the Drina River would have give a unique sense of threat to all Serbs. For this reason Tuzla is a critical point for the war caravan in the Balkans. Will everything be stopped at the last minute? Is it enough to rely on energetic diplomatic help from Russia? An ultimatum is not allowed as a means of exerting pressure, but it is convincingly dangerous because it functions in this way, since it is always possible to use force in the end.

Not only the Serbs, but the whole world will some day be confronted with the dilemma as to what point agreements cannot be made any more, and when methods of humiliation should be used. Sarajevo became history a long time ago. Tuzla might be the town of the biggest drama, and it is important that everybody knows what he has to do until the climax is reached. [sentence as published] The night between 20 and 21 February was declared the night of general victory, and this may be the best sign that no new deadlines should be set, because there is always enough time for defeats. There have been a few wars that ended through an ultimatum, but some of the biggest started exactly in this way.

Serbia

SPO: Muslim-Croat Agreement 'Revised Yalta'

AU0403115194 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Mar 94 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Legalization of Revised Yalta"]

[Text] Belgrade—Yesterday's Croatian-Muslim agreement, backed by the United States and the powerful Western states, presents in its essence the division of the former Yugoslavia into the Western and Russian sphere of interests. That agreement, if it succeeds, will represent an international legalization of a somewhat revised oral agreement reached half a century ago in Yalta among Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. This is said in the statement by the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] Presidency.

Slovenia, Croatia, and about half the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be under the political and economic patronage of the most developed countries in the world, while Serbia, Montenegro, and the Srpska republic will be in the sphere of the political influence of Russia. It will be a region that will not be in the position to count on the economic and technological support by the West for a long time, the SPO says.

As for the republic of Serbian Krajina, its fate will be decided through negotiations between Zagreb, which is becoming increasingly strong economically, and Knin, which on the other hand is economically weakening.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will most likely find itself with Greece and Albania under the political and economic influence of the West, the SPO Presidency says.

Commentary Assesses Russian Action in Bosnia

AU0303134094 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb 94 p 9

[Article by Dragoslav Rancic: "The Return of the Russians"]

[Text] As is usually the case in most dramatic situations, the tragedy was avoided at the last moment. The Russians asked the Serbs to withdraw their artillery from around Sarajevo; the Serbs fulfilled the Russians' wish, while pretending at the same time not to have accepted the NATO ultimatum; the UN representative declared that the warring factions had fulfilled all the requirements and the strategists in Aviano called off the bombing flights. In the meantime, the Russians, in "blue helmets," arrived in Grbavica, defused the time bomb, and left NATO "swimming in an empty pool," thus asserting in grand style their return not only to the Balkans, but also to the international scene.

Moscow celebrated this action as its great diplomatic victory. Yeltsin's headquarters made it known that not a single shot had been fired, not a single life had been threatened, and not a single kopeck had been spent. Russia had regained its historical role in the Balkans and had showed the scope of its influence in Europe and in the world.

Surprised and to some extent offended, the Americans officially thanked the Russians for their skilled action. However, there prevailed the view in the United States that Russia had suddenly changed the Sarajevo scenario on its own. It was claimed that Russia had sent its UN troops to Sarajevo without informing the United States, that it had reached an agreement with the Bosnian Serbs in order to satisfy its nationalists, that it had helped the Serbs to preserve their honor, thus presenting the United States with an accomplished fact.

All other opinions and assessments lie between these two standpoints. One hears the view that Russia has not only saved the honor of the Serbs but also that of the Americans and NATO, and even its own, since, for a long time, it has given in to the West over the Yugoslav crisis. According to the opinion of some, they had offered their support to the Serbs, while, according to others, they had forced them to accept the ultimatum by using persuasion instead of threats.

In Pale, where Russian soldiers were welcomed with bread and salt, the Moscow move was interpreted as a guarantee that the Serbian population around Sarajevo would be protected and that there would not be a change in the strategic balance on the battlefields after the heavy weapons have been withdrawn. Russia had also brought the necessary balance into the peace process and had reestablished the confidence of the Bosnian Serbs in the UN and the international community in general. The view was also expressed that future relations between Russia and the United States might be defined in Bosnia.

There is no doubt that Russia succeeded in reducing the pressure that had built up all over the world as the deadline for the ultimatum drew near. Russia opposed the ultimatum and announced a great diplomatic initiative aimed at securing permanent peace in Bosnia. Taking into account that Russia has not formulated its own concept for resolving the Bosnian crisis since the outbreak of the civil war two years ago and that it has only followed the proposals of the Geneva peace conference and the UN Security Council, the announcement of a diplomatic initiative is already a sign that Russia is ready to participate actively in the peace process in former Yugoslavia. It is immaterial whether this more active role on the part of Russia is a consequence of internal pressure or stems from the view that ultimatums must not become a normal solution to complex international problems.

The initial reactions indicate that Russia has showed that it has the status of a super power again, at least in the Balkans. In addition, it is stated that Russia has always been powerful when it has been a force in the Balkans.

The Russians have shown the West, primarily the Americans, that they will not accept the status of an unequal or simply obedient partner and that their cooperative attitude has perhaps been interpreted in the wrong way. They does not want their good relations with the West, primarily with the United States, to deteriorate, but they indicate that disagreements could serve as a warning to both countries that the balance in international relations must be reestablished, especially between "influential partners," as this is euphemistically expressed by Russian diplomacy.

It seems that the new Russian initiative, which was announced by Kozyrev, and which was probably discussed during the meeting in Bonn, is a part of Yeltsin's proposal to discuss the future of Bosnia at a summit involving the "big five": the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. Most of these countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council; China's place was offered to Germany as the most influential country in the European Union.

At the same time, Russia has announced that the European or the U.S. peace proposals for Bosnia are not the only ones that exist. Russia, for example, does not think that "the Sarajevo model" can be applied easily to other towns, which seems to be a broadly accepted attitude in the West. Not only because they oppose a series of ultimatums, but also for practical reasons: The additional massing of UN peacekeeping forces is very expensive.

Regardless of how the return of the Russians to the Balkans might be assessed, it is true that they have taken away the war toy from NATO strategists and obliged international diplomacy to reconsider all options, except for the bombing one. It can hardly be imagined that bombs could fall on Serbian positions around Sarajevo if Russian "blue helmets" are stationed there. Decisions about possible new ultimatums will also not be passed that easily.

It is not clear what will happen on the diplomatic scene. Will the UN, which has so far been dominated by the United States, realize that its reputation has been enhanced with the help of the Russians, as UN officials claim? What is the role of the Geneva peace conference in the context of the Russian proposal to hold a "big five" summit, given that Owen and Stoltenberg did not participate in the Bonn meeting?

The Russian action and their return to the Balkans will be discussed for a long time, but a difference will be made between tactics and strategy, once the surprise and euphoria have subsided.

Two very important components—the economic and the military—are still missing for a real return of Russian influence to this part of the Balkans. The scope of the first cannot be established on account of the transformation process in Russia, on the one hand, and the blockade of Yugoslavia, on the other. The military component, if "blue helmets" are excluded, is simply inconceivable. This means that, apart from romanticism and tradition, there is only diplomatic and political influence: The Russians have a dialogue with the Serbs based on mutual trust, which no other international power has. The United States and most Western countries are ignoring Serbia as a necessary element in the search for a solution to the Bosnian and Yugoslav crisis in general.

The most important question now is to what extent will Russia, with permission from the West, develop into a strong diplomatic mediator, that is to say, into an influential power.

DP Not To Take Part in New Government

LD0303200694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1629 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 3 Mar (TANJUG)—The Democratic Party [DP] will not take part in the new republican government which Mirko Marjanovic is to form, Democratic Party Chairman Zoran Djindjic said today in TANJUG's guest interview.

"We will not enter the government because we believe that conditions for that are not ripe," Djindjic explained. He said that the Democratic Party's attitude to the government would be one of good will and that its vote would depend on the program presented by the prime minister-designate.

"It is not ruled out that we might vote for the government, and it is not ruled out either that we might abstain, but it is unlikely that we will vote against the government," Djindjic noted.

The Democratic Party leader noted that the idea of a government of national unity, advocated by his party, has been abandoned. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Serbs Issue Ultimatum to Institute

AU0303212594 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] The Serbian authorities in Kosova visited the Albanological Institute again today with the ultimatum that the building be emptied and handed over to them. As a sign of protest against this unprecedented act, Zekeria Cana abandoned his home and moved into the Albanological Institute.

Employees Refuse To Leave

AU0303212494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Text] A Serbian commission in Kosova today threatened the authorities of the Prishtina Albanological Institute to evacuate the building or else they would violently intervene. Concerning this event, here is a telephone report by Shaqir Funiqi:

[Funiqi] The legitimate leaders of the Albanian science and research institute said that only physical violence—the only means of this regime in Kosova—could make them leave their building. After an hour and a half talk, the uninvited emissaries went away, but they left behind the definitive threat that they plan to execute this decision tomorrow.

Meanwhile, it is reported that, as a sign of protest against this invidious and uncivilized act, Professor Dr. Zekeria Cana is remaining in the institution.

The less culture you have, the less culture you need—by promoting this idea, the Serb violence in Kosova is arbitrarily extinguishing the last oasis of Albanian thinking and scientific activity—the Albanological Institute. The wicked Serbian campaign against Albanian culture, which is now being nailed like the Prometheus and is being placed in a grip, is taking on destructive dimensions with a clear postulation—to also conduct the Serbianization of Kosova in the field of culture.

The Albanological Institute, as a model institution of science and knowledge, will certainly survive the violence and will manage to promote the Albanian competent scientific thinking.